While some reports or legal documents are apt -- and probably made -- for interpretation, others are more straightforward. Whereas a regulation becomes binding law in each EU member state and affects the whole of its citizens, a directive allows EU member countries to implement it by themselves -- that refers to transposing it into the body of national law -- and over time, sometimes with up to a six-month period of grace and in a few cases including derogations or opt-outs. Property law and the working time directive are two such examples. A regulation is often complemented by more technical directives including the actual tools for policy implementation. Talking about room for interpretation, and as a further example, the EU stipulates that the Council of Ministers is in charge of only the "broad guidelines" of the EU's economic policy making. More of President Sarkozy's protectionism, more of Prime Minister Brown's laissez-faire; everything is possible in the EU as long as it is based on a functioning market economy. So far, so good. The most recent and eagerly awaited Progress Report for Turkey as published by the EU Commission in a document addressed to both the European Parliament and the Council is no exception to the "open to interpretation" rule. So, where do we stand?
At first sight, the report is an indicator of the level of willingness in European institutions to continue membership talks with Turkey and to offer full membership at the end. It underlines something very important: As Turkey managed to overcome various serious threats to its political stability by itself and came out stronger --presidential elections, party closure cases as examples -- the EU now seems to focus on two key aspects required for a speedy accession. The first one is the political criteria, the second the analytical acquis examination and how far it has been adopted in the last 12 months. The customs union and solving the Cyprus impasse feature, too.
It was surprising to me that 17 pages are devoted to human rights and the protection of minorities and only 50 or so pages were reserved for all the 33 currently relevant -- out of 35 in total -- acquis chapters. Hence, at first sight, it seems to be a disproportionate focusing of attention paid to a few items that matter most to Brussels.
After reading its contents again, one must state though that it was perhaps a perfect moment in time to remind Turkey about the relationship between political criteria and acquis-related, more technical, tasks. Turkey, by now, has the institutional capacity and the political will to fully comply with the political dimension, although legally speaking it is a separate issue from the acquis. Where acquis chapters and political criteria meet can be found in EU treaties when common values including individual freedoms are explained. Technically speaking, Turkey was deemed as having the potential to fully meet its obligations under the political criteria and hence the acquis was presented to Turkey for alignment and transposition.
The point Turkey must always remember is that even if the country becomes acquis-ready in two to three years but is not "politically ready" some EU member states will use this as excuse to delay membership. Likewise it is impossible to adhere to all political criteria without having transposed the acquis in its near-totality at the same time. Economic criteria and the capacity of the EU to absorb new members must not be forgotten about either.
The EU accession process has two major facets, one being more technical and EU-law oriented (and let's be honest, most acquis transpositions go unnoticed by the public eye unless your industry sector is involved in the negotiations or your NGO is a key stakeholder), and the other depending on the political will of the government. As long as Turkey continues to show Europe that political will has been transformed into a political dimension fully in line with the Copenhagen criteria (on political, economic, and acquis criteria), albeit requiring a few more years to be totally compatible with it, much needed support can be enlisted in Brussels and beyond.
A key cross-border advantage comes about when not only governments in power, but also political parties in all EU member states are targeted for "soft" lobbying. For many years, the Greens seemed to have dominated the debate on Turkey in Europe. Social Democrats followed suit. The missing link is the Conservative bloc who might well become Turkey's best friends as economic development and individual liberties form the basis for their policies which are very close to what the present Turkish government endeavors to achieve. A new group, the Conservative Friends of Turkey in the UK, was formed with the backing of William Hague, who confirmed his commitment to Turkey becoming a full EU member once his (Conservative) party is back in power. A similar Labour Party "friendship" is already up and running. All very noteworthy developments, which should immediately be incorporated into Turkey's future: a more proactive lobbying strategy. All parts of the political spectrum must be targeted.
EU accession is a matter for legal experts and politicians but, ultimately, for all citizens, who will greatly benefit. I started my column by saying "five to go." Let's hope the year 2013 will see the final Turkey-EU Progress Report before full membership comes about.
