Of course, we can also argue that today the world is very different from the world that existed before Aug. 7. However, we must highlight the fact that it is still early to name the new era and that we lack sufficient data to do this. Nevertheless, many strategists or international relations experts have rushed with an incomprehensible haste to define the new era as the new Cold War. For this reason, whether the new era can be duly labeled a new cold war era should be exhaustively discussed.First of all, I must say that, the Cold War era of the past in which the possible actions of the parties were predictable to some extent, in which who would react to which situation could be anticipated, in which who had how much power or which party could call which forces for assistance and in which circumstance or what the inventory, military or political, of the parties involved was, could be known with precision is preferable to the current era of uncertainties.
Indeed, the "balance of terror" set up in the Cold War era, though it may not seem melodious to the ears, provided both sides with the comfort of perfect predictability. Moreover, thanks to the strategy of "mutually assured destruction [MAD]," which made its imprint on the Cold War era, the world could be kept distant from destructive armed conflict, and the world lived in an extremely controlled atmosphere of peace, though fragile over the delicate balance of mutual deterrence. It is true that the world lived with the fear that at any moment two poles might engage in a war and that both sides spent considerable part of their economic resources in a perpetual arms race. However, in the final analysis, each of the two blocs in the Cold War world could predict well how the other block would react in each case and this predictability would provide international players with a cautious comfort even in the "balance of terror" atmosphere.
As for today, can we safely make the same statements about today's world? In the period from the 1990s to now, designated by many as the post-Cold War era, which in my opinion is nothing more than an era of cease-fires, humankind has unfortunately failed to establish a new, just, fair, sustainable and peaceful world order. The greatest share of blame for this failure belongs, naturally, to US administrations that acted with an air of victory in the Cold War. In particular, the unilateral policies pursued by neocons arrogantly and at the expense of ignoring the sensitivities of world public opinion played a great role in this failure. In this process, the national pride and interests of Russia, which was the leader of one side of the bipolar world until recently, have not been respected properly and Russia has been treated like a pariah.
The mood and historical reflexes of Russians have never been taken into consideration and Russia has been viewed not as a new partner that can make contributions to the international system, but as a potential enemy that will possibly cause nuisance in the future. The fact that Yeltsin's Russia was open to be a possible NATO member has always been ignored. And finally Russia has decided to make a comeback to the "enemy" role, which the international community, led by the US, has for long been tailoring for it. There is as much blame to be put on those that force Russia to accept it as can be put on Russia.
Following the single ideology of what Arthur Sagdeev calls the "Big Power Ideology," Russians, governed by a czarist or communist or liberal democratic regime, have made a strong comeback to the world's political arena as required by this eternal ideology and by intervening in Georgia. It is obvious that Russia intends to reaffirm its traditional control over the areas from which it had to retreat with the collapse of communism. The policy of rejecting the Russian influence -- instead of sharing influence in the region with Russia, pursued by the US-led international community -- gave the Russian administration a legitimate pretext to return to the field of struggle after gaining much power with rising income from high energy prices.
Yes, it is true that Russians have returned to the international political arena in a very powerful and shocking manner. But, is this comeback sufficient for a new cold war? Absolutely not. This is because neither Russian national interests nor Russia's "big power ideology" can sufficiently provide the infrastructure of ideological and international relations that a cold war would require.
As suggested by Professor İhsan Dağı, an international relations expert, in his column in Zaman daily, there is no cold war in the making, but an expression of Russia's complex for being accepted as a big power via a Georgia affair.
One can do nothing but agree with his following assessments: "The sine qua non aspect of the Cold War was its ideological dimension. … Does Russia's challenging the West today have any ideological basis? It is impossible to legitimize, socialize and sustain a new global tension without an "ideological dimension." The Cold War was at the same time a competition of power between two "military blocs." Political and ideological tensions could be maintained under the assurance and control of a "military" alliance structure. Therefore, the Cold War was an "inter-bloc" contention. Where are today's blocs? The Cold War was possible in models of economy and society that could be isolated from one another. Today, global capitalism has permeated all societies. Dependencies, or more correctly "mutual dependencies," are making a global bloc formation and conflict impossible. Recently, societies and economies have connected to each other with an indestructible nexus. Any attempt to destroy this nexus means destruction of societies. Economies and welfare do not accept a continuous or new "Cold War." Failure to "cooperate" has costs that neither Russia nor the West can bear.
As we will see, the reintroduction of a new cold war is impossible. Yet, this new era does not imply that there will not be armed clashes, or "hot wars," with unknown consequences. This is the real danger that awaits us.
