President Abdullah Gül said on Aug. 12 he supports the "Caucasus Stability Forum" idea voiced by Erdoğan. "I believe the idea of establishing a Caucasus Stability Forum is important. If there is stability in the region and if problems can be solved before they grow in magnitude and if there is a secure environment, then this will bring economic development and welfare to the people in the region," Gül said. Prime Minister Erdoğan made public his proposal for the establishment of a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform on Aug. 13 in Moscow and on Aug. 14 in Tbilisi. The various titles given by Erdoğan and Gül to this proposal concerning the Caucasus -- the Caucasus Alliance, the Caucasus Stability Forum and the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform -- imply that Turkey's policy on this issue is still ripe. What is the Caucasus Stability Pact? What is Turkey trying to do now by giving a green light to the Caucasus Stability Pact (CSP) which it disapproved of in 2000? Moreover, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE), which is advertised as a model for the Caucasus Stability Pact, was terminated in 2008 on the grounds that it was a clumsy and dysfunctional organization. Apparently, Turkey has made up its mind on the name, choosing "Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform" in order to make a fresh proposal by securing the involvement of the Russian Federation.
Toward two similar pacts in southeastern Europe: SPSEE and CSP
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the SPSEE was established on July 30, 1999 in Sarajevo as the most important non-Kremlin-centered pact within the former Eastern bloc. It had been thought that this pact, established as a brain child of the European Union and under the supervision of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), might serve as a model for similar packs, particular in the Caucasus -- outside the OSCE borders -- and that this would trigger the establishment of several other pacts in the former Eastern bloc territories. Indeed, on Jan. 15, 2000, about six months after the establishment of the SPSEE, the establishment of the CSP was proposed with inspiration from the SPSEE.
Given the fact that the two sides of the Black Sea -- the Balkans and the Caucasus -- are two parts of Southeastern Europe, the urge to establish the CSP following the formation of the SPSEE and the similarities between the two pacts is to be expected. The two pacts, addressing a region which was in search of security, stability and development, would be merged or cooperate under a single umbrella organization at a further stage. After the abolition of the SPSEE in 2008, the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) was established in its place and Turkey became a member. Other than the RCC, there is also the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), of which Turkey is a member, in the Balkans.
The CSP model
On Jan. 15, 2000 former President Süleyman Demirel held a joint press conference with former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and suggested that the CSP should be established under the aegis of the OSCE. Given the fact that Iran is not a member of the OSCE, this proposal by Ankara, which was supported by Tbilisi as well, meant that Iran would not be part of this pact. Before the meeting of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), held on Jan. 24-25, Demirel sent letters to the leaders of Western European countries and countries in the region, requesting their support for the CSP proposal and explaining the necessity of such a pact. The US, France, Germany, the UK, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russia, Armenia and the EU responded positively to this initiative.
In his letter, Demirel stated that the SPSEE served as a good model and that the international community's interest in issues in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe was growing. He stressed that the pact plan was supported by Georgia and Azerbaijan. Demirel also pointed out that disputes and hot conflicts in the Caucasus, which, like the Balkans, was in need of stability, served as a threat to regional peace. He noted that certain unresolved issues of the Caucasus were not only blocking the establishment of stability in the region, but also pushing the opportunities for developing multilateral and strong cooperation to second place. Thus, the firs t stage of the CSP proposal was completed by bringing the issue to the agenda of the international community in an effective manner. The second stage called for negotiation between parties concerned to commence.
However, the south Caucasian republics are unlikely to adopt the resolution that came out of the CIS meeting held in Moscow on Jan. 24-25, 2000, only 10 days after Demirel's proposal that stressed a CSP plan which exceeds the borders of the CIS and which does not include the Russian Federation. Indeed, the biggest difference between the SPSEE and the CSP was that while the countries which are part of the SPSEE were former Warsaw Pact members, the south Caucasian countries that would become part of the CSP were former Soviet republics and the north Caucasus were located within the borders of the Russian Federation with seven federal republics. And the Russian Federation made its inclusion obligatory in the search for cooperation "outside" the family while it did not require its inclusion in any similar search "within" the family -- the CIS. Given the conditions prevalent at the time, the Turkish Foreign Ministry, too, was not warm to the idea of setting up a pact that did not embrace the Russian Federation.
Future of search for cooperation in Caucasus
With the statements made by Prime Minister Erdoğan on Aug. 11 and President Gül on Aug. 12, Turkey launched an active foreign policy initiative. Indeed, Erdoğan went to Moscow on Aug. 13 and to Tbilisi on Aug. 14, one day after French President Nicolas Sarkozy's visit. Since Sarkozy was representing the EU as the term president, but not France, Erdoğan was the first prime minister to visit Tbilisi since the conflict in Georgia began. Turkey's official presence in Tbilisi was a correct foreign policy move. Erdoğan's delegation included Foreign Minister Ali Babacan and Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister Ahmet Davudoğlu, signaling that Turkey will treat the Caucasus as one of its foreign policy priorities.
Turkey is seeking the establishment of a pact primarily focused on security, stability and development with the participation of the south Caucasus, the Russian Federation and Western countries. The main areas of concern for this pact will be the restructuring of the Caucasian republics' economies, ensuring development and cooperation, boosting economic cooperation with the world, fostering free trade, supporting the private sector, ensuring environmental protection, putting to use existing and future energy and transportation lines extending from the east to the west, regulating the administrative structure, ensuring administrative transparency, tackling refugee issues and ensuring their integration as well as similar issues.
Parallel to the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, the Caucasus House initiative, which serves as a platform among Caucasian intellectuals and nongovernmental organizations, should be supported and the inclusion of Turkish intellectuals and nongovernmental organizations should be ensured. A Caucasus Club may be established along the lines of the Balkan Political Club, formed with the participation of former heads of state in the Balkans. By keeping the doors of dialogue open at a high level, this may serve to put an end to emerging conflicts. The Eurasian Cooperation Action Plan, signed by and between Turkey and the Russian Federation on Nov. 6, 2001, may be revitalized with a view to boost cooperation in economic, cultural and educational issues with the Russian Federation in the Eurasian region, including the Caucasus. Turkey may invest labor and hard work in the reorganization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which was established in 1992 under the leadership of Turkey, so as to prevent the emergence of problems and conflicts in the region and to discuss political issues.
The biggest problem haunting the search for cooperation in the Caucasus is the lack of sufficient social, political and economic institutions in the Caucasian republics. It is considerably important to secure the territorial integrity of these republics and implement successful democratic and economic reforms. For this reason, the assistance provided to these countries particularly aims at restructuring democratic institutions, strengthening the economic structure and fostering the development of civil society and law. The success of the south Caucasian countries is dependent on the development of democracy and civil society and making their economies part of the global economy, including the marketing of oil resources. Ensuring security, stability and development in the region -- including the Caucasus and Central Asia and ranging from the Mediterranean to China -- will ease efforts in carrying Caucasian and Central Asian oil and natural gas to international markets. It would be a beneficial and realistic move to launch a regional development program and a regional peace program with the participation of the Russian Federation and within the framework of the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform.
