Is nationalism fading in the Balkans?

The streets of central Belgrade are closed to car traffic. The flocks of people promenading or having drinks in the many cafes on those streets did not seem to me to be bothered at all either by Kosovo's declaration of independence or by the government crisis produced by the inconclusive elections last month. Serbia is, however, a country torn between the "yes" and "no" camps regarding the European Union as witnessed by the election results.

In the elections held on May 11, President Boris Tadic's pro-EU Democratic Party won 39 percent of the vote and 102 seats out of 250 in parliament. The ultranationalist Radical Party led by Tomislav Nikolic won 29 percent of the vote and 78 seats, and the party led by Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica (who turned against the EU when it backed the secession of Kosovo) got 11 percent of the vote and 30 seats. The rest of the votes and seats were shared between smaller parties. Ever since the election, Tadic's camp and the alliance between Nikolic and Kostunica have tried to put together a coalition to form the next Serbian government, so far without success. If they fail within 90 days following the election, there will have to be new polls, which nobody in the country wants after having six elections during the last 18 months.

Believe it or not, the key to the new government in Serbia is held by the Socialist Party, founded by none other than Slobodan Milosevic ("the Butcher of the Balkans," who was found dead in 2006 while on trial at the International Criminal Court at The Hague). Socialists who failed to reach a consensus with the nationalist camp have recently started negotiations with the Tadic party to form a pro-EU coalition government. Serbian colleagues have told me that the majority of Serbians are in favor of EU accession, while remaining strongly opposed to NATO membership due to having been the target of bombings by NATO forces in 1999 during the initial Kosovo crisis. The Serbian military I was told, however, interestingly does not view NATO membership negatively, a fact that is perhaps related to Yugoslav history.

I was in Belgrade on the occasion of a conference on "New Nationalisms in the Balkans," organized by the Bluebird Club, which brings together journalists and academics from various Balkan countries. One of the most noteworthy points that was raised during the discussions was that nationalism in the Balkans in the post-Cold War period was of not ideological but instrumental character, and that following the formation of polities based on cultural homogeneity, the region has entered into a period when nationalism is fading and the focus is increasingly on state building and consolidation.

According to Albanian colleagues I met at the conference, the idea of a "Greater Albania" is no longer alive. Just as German-speaking people live in Germany, Austria and Switzerland and elsewhere, so do Albanian-speaking people live in Albania, Kosovo (where they make up 95 percent of the population), Macedonia (where they make up 25 percent of the population) and elsewhere. The Albanians of Albania today are more interested in the state of the economy than anything else, including the fate of Kosovo. It is the diasporas that are nationalistic and not the local people. According to Serbian colleagues, it is no longer a daring thing to argue in the Belgrade press that Serbia will eventually have to recognize Kosovo's independence and that the party founded by Milosevic may very well join the pro-EU coalition government of Serbia.

It is clear to me that the EU perspective is the major factor that is helping nationalism to subside in the Balkans and that full stability in the Western Balkans can only be achieved by EU enlargement. I, therefore, believe that the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty by 40 percent of Irish citizens who participated in the recent referendum, many of whom had no idea of the stakes involved, is nothing to be celebrated anywhere.