It can be assumed that in the wake of Sept. 11, Washington, like Brussels, better understands that an increasingly democratic and prosperous Turkey, a source of inspiration for liberals and democrats in the rest of the Muslim world, is in the interests of the West and the world at large.The case before the Constitutional Court asking for the closure of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has garnered nearly half of the vote in parliamentary elections last July, is a "judicial coup" attempt that seriously threatens democracy in Turkey. The crisis created by the case may be said to provide an opportunity to test the assumption that the West does care about democracy in Turkey.
Let's begin with the EU. The EU Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP) and governments of various EU member states, mainly Britain, Sweden and Germany, have all strongly reacted to the closure case and stated their support for continued democratic reforms in Turkey. This is surely most welcome and may indeed at least partially make up for the EU's loss of "soft power" over Turkey and perhaps eventually boost reforms. Certain other EU members have, however, either (like France) kept ominously silent or (like Austria) declared total disinterest. Austria's foreign minister, on visit in Ankara in late April, was content to say: "Turks will have to find a way out of this problem themselves. We cannot become some sort of an arbiter…" while not missing the opportunity to reiterate the offer to Turkey to consider a "privileged partnership" with rather than full membership in the EU. It seems possible that some EU members will try to seize on the closure of the AKP as an opportunity to suspend (never to resume) accession negotiations.
How about the US? It was clear during the Cold War years that Washington was more interested in seeing pro-US governments in charge in Ankara, whatever their nature, as witnessed by its active support or silent approval of the various military interventions the country has experienced since the 1960s. Turkish democrats will never forget when in 2003 the Turkish Parliament rejected a resolution to allow US troops to invade Iraq from Turkish territory and US Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz blamed the Turkish military for not playing "a leadership role." The rift between Washington and Ankara ensuing from Turkish non-cooperation in the invasion of Iraq has only recently and partially been mended. Today Turkish public opinion does not have a clear picture of the position of the Bush administration on the current crisis in Turkey. The broadly shared impression is that the Bush administration cares less for democracy in Turkey than maintaining good relations with the Turkish military for continued access to its facilities.
The US stance perhaps best finds its expression in the words of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who said the AKP closure case is "a matter … for Turks to decide" (April 16) or in the words of the head of the State Department's European Bureau: "We are not taking sides." This stance has angered American supporters of Turkish democracy. Former Ambassador to Turkey Morton Abramowitz and Henri J. Barkey wrote: "The US cannot stand on the sidelines … [and] must make clear privately and, if necessary, publicly that attempting to remove the AKP in this manner endangers bilateral cooperation." (Newsweek, April 14, 2008)
A Washington Post editorial called on the Bush administration "to make it plain that banning the AKP would cause serious damage to US-Turkish relations." (May 2, 2008) Another former ambassador to Ankara, Mark R. Parris, was most explicit: "To suggest, as the Bush administration has come close to doing, that the US is indifferent to the AKP's fate would be myopic." (WSJ, May 17, 2008)
The Bush administration may not be receptive to advice. But the next (and hopefully Democratic) administration should seriously consider the following: The split in Turkey is between democrats and authoritarian Kemalists. The increasingly paranoid and xenophobic Kemalist establishment is no longer in favor of Turkey's continued Westernization and modernization. Democratically elected governments -- and not the Kemalist establishment -- stand for the country's integration with the EU and for close (but not dependent) relations with the US.
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