As secular as Turkey gets

In Turkey, however, secularism is limited with the legal system. State and religion are not separated. Sunni Islam as represented by the Religious Affairs Directorate is the non-official state religion. The state does not treat all religious beliefs equally. The largest minority religion, Alevism, and non-Muslim beliefs not mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 are not officially recognized. The directorate, which controls all religious affairs, is financed by taxes paid by all citizens, irrespective of religion. There are compulsory religion courses at schools. Religious freedoms are restricted. Sufi religious brotherhoods have been outlawed since 1925. Muslim women are not allowed to wear headscarves in public buildings, schools and universities. The graduates of all vocational schools, including public preacher and prayer leader schools, are discriminated against in university entrance examinations. Those who have not completed eight years of compulsory schooling are not entitled to take Quran courses.

The CHP fully supports the above system. It has so far taken no initiative to address the demands of the Alevis, who constitute most of its voters. The AKP, too, is basically supportive of this system, but it at least wants to lift some of the restrictions on religious freedom. It has finally initiated constitutional amendments to lift the ban on the headscarf at universities. It is trying to ease restrictions on Quran courses and end discrimination against graduates of vocational schools. Since the last general elections, the AKP government has also started some initiatives toward official recognition of Alevism.

The AKP recently enacted the foundations law, which stipulates the return of property that had been seized by the state from non-Muslim foundations, and lifts the restrictions on their right to acquire property. The CHP (and the Nationalist Movement Party [MHP]), on the other hand, did their utmost to obstruct this law, claiming it violates Turkey's sovereignty and independence. When three Christian missionaries, two of them Turkish citizens, were murdered in Malatya last year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared: "In this country there are not only Muslims. We as the government do what secularism necessitates and treat all beliefs equally. It is our duty to secure the rights of non-Muslims, too. ... In Europe, Turks have opened close to 6,000 mosques. We have to provide equal guarantees for churches and synagogues in this country." Spokespersons for the CHP (and MHP), on the other hand, have often declared Christian missionaries a threat to Turkey's sovereignty and independence.

The AKP government intends to reopen the Greek Orthodox seminary on Heybeliada Island in Istanbul. Erdoğan has recently reversed the official position and stated that whether or not the Istanbul Greek Orthodox patriarch uses the title of "ecumenical" is a purely internal matter of the Greek Orthodox Church. The CHP (and MHP), on the other hand, are strongly opposed to both the reopening of the seminary and the patriarch's use of the title "ecumenical."

The Council of State, in line with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, recently decided that religion courses in Turkish schools had to become optional. When the president of the Religious Affairs Directorate reacted strongly to the Council of State decision, it was a deputy from the AKP who said the issue did not at all concern the directorate, while the CHP kept silent.

These are the main indicators that prompt me to conclude that the AKP is a relatively more secular party compared to the CHP. Erdoğan, however, must have felt that his party had moved too far in this direction, when in a clear reference to Muslim religious law he recently made the following statement: "The right to pardon a murderer belongs not to the state but to the relatives of the slain!" This is, I suppose, as secular as Turkey gets.