Ever since Parliament rejected a motion to let American troops use Turkish territory for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 relations between the two countries have been strained and the vision of “strategic alliance” has been lost. While the US has blamed the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), of which Gül was the first prime minister, Turkey has turned the charges against the neoconservatives in Washington. Most of the neocons responsible for the Iraq war have now left the Bush administration and the AK Party is again in power, having received a more powerful mandate with the July 2007 elections. After five years of tensions fed by deep mistrust and opposing policies, US-Turkish relations seem to have entered a new honeymoon period. The reasons for this sea change are multiple and have significant implications for the future of relations between the two countries.President Gül is no stranger to the White House. He has been there and to other Western capitals before as foreign minister. His first visit as president, however, confirms the process of normalization in Turkey. Last year was fraught with major political crises and showdowns between the military and the government. Gül’s nomination for president in April 2007 sparked a series of events that led to street demonstrations, a constitutional stalemate, the calling of early elections and finally his election as president in August. The fact that these crises were overcome despite fears of a military intervention shows the strength of Turkish democracy.
These domestic developments have important bearings on US-Turkish relations. The current US administration and the one that will come to power next year will have to accept the new realities of Turkey. Turkey is no longer a small agent of the cold war era that wants to secure itself by living under the comfortable shadow of a superpower. Turkey’s internal soul-searching and its desire to be a prosperous, democratic and secular country with a strong Muslim population has led it to experiment with a “conservative modernity” in a way that has become of interest to other Muslim countries in the region. As Turkey consolidates its social cohesion and strengthens its economy, it is becoming impervious to the arbitrary interventions of irresponsible actors. Furthermore, as Turkey becomes an active player in regional and international politics, it will be able to avoid petty nationalisms and isolationist regionalisms. Some elements in the Bush administration have failed to understand these deep changes in Turkey’s new perspective on domestic and international issues.
The issues of the separatist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) terrorism and the so-called Armenian genocide bill have hurt US-Turkish relations over the last two decades. The Turkish public is suspicious of the American support for Turkey in its fight against the PKK. The fact that the Bush administration has been quiet about the PKK installments in northern Iraq, which is under the rule of Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdish regional administration, has inflamed anti-American and anti-Barzani sentiments in Turkey. The Armenian genocide bill brought to the Senate floor by Nancy Pelosi, the speaker of the house, also continues to hurt US-Turkish relations. However, there are more important areas in which the US and Turkish perspectives part ways. The Bush administration’s catastrophic failures in its Middle East policies have alienated its traditional allies in the region. Now Turkey and the US see things differently in Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Syria and Russia as well as in such strategic issues as energy security, democratization and regime changes. As Turkey increases its depth in regional politics, it runs against the Bush administration’s wall of America’s exceptionalism, exaggerated threats and misplaced fears.
Turkey insists on getting Iran and Syria on board to secure Iraq’s future and contain the nuclear issue. Turkey is concerned about Iraq’s territorial integrity and wants to secure it not just by words but by concrete action, which means redefining the system of loose federalism and the power balance in Iraq. The Erdoğan government, which has maintained good relations with Israel, sees Hamas as part of any lasting solution to the Palestinian problem. The meeting of Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres in Ankara before the Annapolis meeting confirms Turkey’s increasing role in the Middle East peace process. Turkish-Russian relations have both strategic and economic significance. Turkey no longer sees Russia as the clumsy and always-hungry bear of the cold war era. On all these issues and others, Turkey and the US have a lot to sort out. Gül’s visit to the White House could be a chance to draw Washington’s attention to the new realities of Turkey and the region. At a time when US soft power has been lost and replaced by tough talk and irresponsible shows of military power, Washington needs a new perspective on the Middle East and Central Asia. To maintain its power, the US must learn to live with the emerging regional powers, understand the consequences of being a hegemonic power and develop mechanisms of power-sharing in global politics. US-Turkish relations over the last five years are indicative of these tectonic changes and they are likely to repeat themselves in America’s relations with its other allies in the region. Gül’s visit could be an opportunity to get a new perspective on the region before President Bush begins his tour of the Middle East.
