In the past they would be completely disappointed. Indeed the experiences in the recent past have shown that if external conjuncture is the mere determining factor, it would be and will always be misleading to rely on it. It was clearly observed that in all interventions, from that of May 27 to Feb. 28, the “external world” did not particularly bother with them, even somehow tolerating them. The attitude the Western world assumed with respect to the accidents Turkish democracy had can be conveniently described as “tolerance.” Based on a salient motive for interests and pragmatism, this tolerance does not “in principle” approve of military interventions. However, when Turkey, a strategic ally, is in question, everything changes and military interventions are treated with “tolerance.” Nevertheless the external world does not currently have good opinion of internal authoritarian and anti-democratic groups as these regimes have cost everyone dearly.The steep wave rising all over the Islamic world with extensive democratic demands was perceived by some global powers as a “threat,” particularly after Sept. 11. But today, it has been understood that the wave in question was in fact a demand for more democracy. After Sept. 11, global powers wanted to make Muslims the “other.” Yes, this is true, but the efforts by the internal oppressive regimes toward making Muslims the “other” is even more massive and destructive. The development in the internal texture of social life as well as the map of meaning this implies have come to be seen as more important.
The threshold through which not only Turkey but also the entire Islamic world has to go is full of obstacles and traps, recalling the thin line between barbarism and civilization.
It is hard to say with confidence that since 1946 when Turkey implemented democracy it has managed to fully “internalize the democratic political culture,” or that everyone in Turkey has fully accepted the multi-party parliamentary regime. Here, “everyone” refers not to the people who are the true subjects of politics and public life in normal democracies, but to the power elites who think that society can be guided through top-down, repressive methods and policies as well as the core in the center created through solidarity among these elites. The core in the center corresponds to “asabiyyah” in the famous conceptualization of Ibn Haldun. And for this reason, it has a very hard and resistive crust.
If tensions arise with respect to the Turkey’s EU bid, this is because the groups in this core, which have secured privileges up to date, resist to efforts to restructure them according to the EU standards. No change has been introduced to the “internal law” since it was adopted in the first quarter of the last century.
Democracy means having trust in people. In the final analysis, democracy is not a well-matured and well-defined regime, but it continuously functions, develops and evolves. The basic problem here is about where and how the societies from a certain historical and religious culture and heritage join in this functioning process and to which extent they can affect this process. The great distance between the current state of democracy, which implies an ability to be influential on concrete political regime mechanisms, and its level in Turkey, where it is currently subject to efforts to freeze and limit it to a narrow framework, is in fact the greatest problem with our dysfunctional democracy. The primary trouble with our democracy is that the imperious political culture of the power elites is not open to or suitable for democracy.
