Before Parliament's rejection of this motion, whose negative effects on the ties between the two NATO allies still continue, a decree was approved by the government that allowed US forces to gather together warships near Turkish shores as well as upgrade Turkish facilities to assist the invasion. The initial decree allowing warships to anchor near the Turkish coast was perceived by the US as the first sign that Turkey would approve the later request for use of its territory. But this did not happen, seriously damaging the reliability of ties between the two countries. Turkey made a grave mistake when it first allowed the US begin its war preparations, creating an atmosphere of a "done deal" -- a perception that Parliament would not reject the motion to come.
Naturally the United States felt strongly that it had been deceived by the Turkish side.
The revelations made to the daily Milliyet yesterday by Turkey's former Chief of General Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök, concerning his version of the events preceding the rejection of the motion and afterwards, reminded me of those days -- which I followed closely as a journalist.
It is worth briefly mentioning here developments that took place in Turkey before March 1. The current ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) had won the November 2002 elections, defeating the three-party coalition government of the time, which had already started initial negotiations between the US and Turkey's then-Chief of General Staff Gen. Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu (now retired), over the possibility of US forces using Turkish soil. In August of the same year Özkök took over from Kıvrıkoğlu and became the new chief of General Staff.
So Turkey had a brand new government and top commander. Anti-Americanism had already begun to grow in the civilian and military sectors, mainly due to the Gulf war, which Turkey sporadically blames, along with the US, for the emergence of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Compounding the situation was that the country's politically powerful military in particular did not hide its distaste for the AK Party's Islamic background.
Özkök, for his part, acted in a pragmatic manner, declaring his respect for the people's choice on November 2002, bringing the AK Party to power. But his senior commanders, including then-Land Forces Commander Gen. Aytaç Yalman and Gendarmerie Commander Gen. Şener Eruygur (both now retired), were particularly known for their anti-Americanism and anti-AK Party position.
And both commanders had been heavily involved in lengthy negotiations with the US side over the parameters of US using Turkish soil as a second front for the invasion of Iraq.
The fact that AK Party government was both new and inexperienced, coupled with the top commanders' implicit and explicit negative stance towards the former and the US, created an image that the top commanders did not want to play into the hands of the government by making public their views that the adoption of the March 1 motion was in the nation's interests. This mood complicated the events resulting from the rejection of the March 1 motion.
But the core factor complicating the decision making process in Turkey and culminating with the rejection of the motion was the existence of an ongoing power struggle between the political leadership and the staunchly secular, military-led elite.
An interview published in Milliyet a few days before the motion was to be discussed in Parliament, quoting an unidentified senior commander -- later determined to be Yalman -- who said that negotiations with the US were going badly, irritated the government at the time.
I remember AK Party deputy Salih Kapusuz saying it was understood that commanders were not happy with a motion allowing US soldiers to use Turkish soil. "It will then be better to wait for the outcome of the National Security Council (MGK) meeting [held Feb. 28, 2003] before Parliament debates the motion," Kapusuz told the press at the time.
The reason Kapusuz referred to the MGK meeting was the council's weight at the time when it came to top generals in the country's decision making process. It was in 2003 that the MGK became an advisory board by law, modifying its earlier function of imposing decisions on the political leadership.
But military members of the MGK did not express any view on the motion -- allegedly something that strongly influenced Parliament's rejection of the motion.
In his interview with Milliyet yesterday, in response to a question about the fact that both he and the president at the time were blamed for withholding their opinions about opening a second front for US forces, leaving the responsibility solely on the government, Özkök said he could not have imposed his will (the military's will) over Parliament's decision.
I do not expect either Özkök or the government will tell the Turkish public the real version of the events that ended in the rejection of the March 1 motion. After all, the real version of the story lies behind the reality that political leaders in Turkey do not rule and govern; they have to share their power with appointed bureaucrats while being held accountable for all policy matters.
This paradoxical situation should come to an end if political leaders do want to bear responsibility alone for the decisions made, also being the only ones held accountable for the mistakes of appointed bureaucrats.
