It is not known what al-Sadr had "read" about the great resistance fighter of the last century as he was heading towards becoming the 21st century "resistance fighter" of the Arab world. However, it is certain that both leaders act with the same reflex and most probably read the same "urban guerilla" manifestos.
Until he made the southern districts of Beirut his headquarters, Arafat had headquarters in almost every country in the Arab world. Al-Fatah's formation process that started in Qatar and Kuwait, moved to Egypt, Jordan and Syria to form a front with the enemy, and after being driven out of these countries, it "deliberately" fell into its own trap.
During the 60 days when the Israeli army blockaded southern Beirut, Arafat and his men were on the verge of disappearance on one hand, and dominated the world agenda on the other hand. This is the inevitable paradox of guerilla warfare: If you want to make your voice heard in the world, then you will have to wander around the verge of disappearance.
While Al-Fatah was leaving Beirut after a 60-day siege, it was yelling shouts of victory. The smiles on the faces of both Arafat and Abu Jihad who went into exile, are scenes etched indelibly in the memories of those who witnessed those days. A commander and his soldiers, who lost on the battlefield, won the image battle that day.
Even if what happened in Najaf is not exactly the same as this, it may be better though. Al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army left Najaf as the "natural" leaders of the Iraqi resistance. Like Arafat did, al-Sadr also bargains by making concessions on the "original target"; nonetheless, this does not hold him back from reflecting every action of his as victory just as it was in Arafat's case.
Najaf did not surrender to the enemy, and very fortunately, al-Sadr became a war veteran with non-fatal injuries (something Arafat would have wished to have). Then 80-year-old [Grand Ayatollah Ali] al-Sistani went to 30-year-old al-Sadr and recognized the legality of his resistance, and finally, the Americans themselves came to accept that they see al-Sadr as a leader they can talk to.
The transformation Arafat underwent immediately after his Beirut exile in 1982, may give us some clues about the activities of the Mahdi Army in the future. As a matter of fact, the march to Najaf from various parts in Iraq show that this transformation study is being done.
Settling in Tunisia after 1982, Arafat on one hand formed a shadow team of representatives that was more acceptable to "the enemy and the West," and started the Oslo process with this team, then on the other hand, he launched the First Intifada under the command of Abu Jihad.
The Intifada was not aimed at succumbing to Israel, which until then had not recognized the Palestinian government in exile, but at bringing the Israelis to the negotiation table. And it also succeeded in doing so.
The Najaf march was the harbinger of the Mahdi Army gradually transforming its militarist and armed structure into a popular revolt. A massive popular revolt including the young and old, women and men carrying stones and sometimes Molotov cocktails in their hands, will make the job of the occupation forces in Iraq and the domestic and foreign police forces established by them even more difficult.
It is not known whether al-Sadr will back down and present another Shiite leader who will talk with the American and Iraqi forces. Perhaps al-Sistani, who has one foot in the grave, is just fulfilling that mission.
August 30, 2004
