The same sources said that the military invasion would start in the beginning of April 2007. This was critical news that both the Turkish establishment and a part of the public have long been anticipating. However, it did not take long for Mr. Barzani to refute these tidings.
However, let us for one moment assume that under American pressure the Kurdish leadership gave the go-ahead to the Turkish armed forces. Will it bring relief as expected? Or will the operations further aggravate the gangrene that is referred to as the “Kurdish problem”? This remains to be seen.
Yellow light for operations
As much as the hardship of obtaining the consent of the Kurdish leadership, American reluctance was also a problem. The reasons are obvious. The American command in Iraq did not want to lose the support of their only ally in this hostile country. And the Iraqi Kurdish leadership wanted to keep the PKK in their territory as a trump card against the expressed antagonism of the Turkish government and military to the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish administration in Iraq, let alone probable independence. As the prospects of a civil war and the eventual dissolution of Iraq came into sight, the worries of the Turkish establishment concerning the evolution of Kurdish autonomy into a fully fledged independent Kurdish state grew stronger. As Turkish worries mounted so did its antagonistic rhetoric against Iraqi Kurdish leaders.
In the past both the Barzani and Talabani peshmergas fought alongside or provided logistic support for Turkish forces chasing PKK militia on Iraqi soil. After all the PKK was Turkey’s phenomenon and its armed existence was also a threat to the authority of the Iraqi Kurdish leadership who did not want to share their newly won sovereignty wrested from the Saddam government in the 1990s.
Positive signals out of Washington concerning untying the hands of the Turkish military must be due to a mixture of the Turkish military’s constant pressure on the US authorities and complaints of an ally’s unfaithfulness in dire times. The other factor must definitely be the reluctant attitude of the Turkish government concerning talks with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and winning their hearts.
Assuming that the green light is in sight, what are the chances of success of military operations to quell the PKK and end the “Kurdish problem” once and for all? However, before saying anything on the subject let us look at the results of a non-scientific (not based on random sampling) poll taken by a newspaper (Hurriyet) last week using electronic media.
A total of 302,135 people responded to the question “Should the Turkish army enter Iraq?” The results were 34 percent said “yes” and 58.8 percent said “no, it would be hazardous.” Another 7.2 percent wanted a diplomatic solution. This figure is added to those who do not want a military option, making a sizeable majority.
This is not a reliable survey but it gives an impression of popular leanings, especially as it was conducted by a daily that is known for its nationalistic credentials. Yet the Turkish establishment wants to go ahead with the military option. Why?
First of all, the Turkish ruling elite cannot abandon the basic tenets of the nationalist ethos that says any group other than Turks is a potential danger to the national unity of Turkey. So Kurds in general are suspected of separatist inclinations. Of course the PKK’s terror campaign helps to keep this suspicion fresh and warm. However, the thought of severing the tie between millions of Kurdish citizens in Turkey with this armed organization never occurred to the Turkish ruling elite.
The security concept of Turkey has always evaded the human element in the equation. The harsher methods pre-empted softer ones and methods to win the hearts and minds of the people have been neglected. Hence any cultural or political demand, no matter how reasonable, has been repressed on security grounds, further widening the boundaries of opposition to the system and complicating integration.
The trajectory of opposition, slowly evolving into resistance and from resistance to armed conflict, has not been fully grasped. A problem that could be (peacefully)solved at the social-economic-political level has evolved into armed confrontation, further hiding the true nature of the issue. That is why the Kurdish problem and violence are intertwined, making both indiscernible.
The American influence and lingering questions
On the other hand the US infatuation in dealing with terrorism through military means has reinforced the traditional Turkish attitude and puts forward no other option than organizing cross-border operations as if the root cause of the problem was in Iraq. The impending operation will be the litmus test of the correctness of the method employed so far. There are, however, a few questions that need answering.
1- There are about 1,000-1,500 PKK militants in Turkey and 3,500-4,000 in camps and caves on Kandil Mountain in northern Iraq. How come those in Turkey have not been eradicated yet? If so, will those residing on the mountain, obviously well entrenched in the caves and labyrinths of the tunnels they built in previous years, be smoked out?
2- Now that the word is out that Turkey will attack, will they sit there like sitting ducks or disperse to safer locations given the leniency of the local Kurdish administration and the American command who sees the possibility of using this organization’s influence on the Kurdish opposition movements in Syria and Iran, the notorious members of the axis of evil?
3- The part of the Kandil Mountains where the PKK has dug in is not that close to Turkey. An infantry operation is out of question for logistical reasons and the possible hostility of local Kurds. Hence an air and helicopter attack must be planned. How effective would that be given the territorial affinity of the militia in the area? If this is the case, then is this whole scheme a way to let off steam to ease the mounting political pressure on the Turkish government and the military? Even that may ease the increasingly radical nationalist surge in Turkey and increase the AK Party’s electoral chances. Letting off steam may also help the Turkish military ease its frustration vis-a-vis American intransigence with Turkish sensitivities that has recently been hampering relations between Turkey and the US.
4- What if local Kurds are hurt during the operations or scenarios to that effect are hatched that may bring the Turkish and Kurdish armed forces (of the regional Kurdish administration) head to head? We know that the latter’s military capabilities have increased considerably in the past decade thanks to their American patrons.
From what we read in the press the cross-border operation may be carried out with approximately 40,000 men. According to international news sources, Kurdish brigades have been sent to take part in the new Baghdad security plan. “Kurdish brigades are well trained to fight inside cities and neighborhoods, and they will contribute vigorously in cleansing Baghdad’s suburbs of armed men and outlaws,” (Gulf News). Amer Al Hussaini, a prominent figure in the Shiite Sadr group, told the Gulf News: “The Kurdish Peshmerga forces which most of the Iraqi army brigades are formed from, stationed in Dohuk, Arbil and Suleiymaniya, amount to 80,000. This might rise to 120,000 because of the escalation of security threats in Baghdad and also Turkey’s threats to the federal Kurdistan region regarding ownership of Kirkuk.”
Given this assessment, could there be an “accident” that may turn the whole affair into a local bloody entanglement?
These are necessary questions that must be asked before an operation that will obviously yield more psychological results than concrete is carried out. But there are two practical initiatives that must be considered if Turkey must really rid itself of this problem that has reached the level of a gangrene poisoning the country:
1- It must distinguish between the Kurdish problem that will and must be settled within Turkey. This way political violence perpetrated by the PKK with the excuse that the Kurdish problem remains unsolved will lose its legitimacy.
2- Despite the existing suspicions and tensions, Turkey and Iraqi Kurds need each other. A Kurdish entity in northern Iraq could become a buffer between Turkey and the turmoil to the south, while Turkey could become the business partner and protector of a Kurdish entity that, though still technically part of Iraq, will be effectively cut loose from Baghdad if a united Iraq becomes an impossibility.
To realize this, Turkey must remember that the relatives of its citizens are living across its southern borders and not its enemies, and the Iraqi Kurds must convince the suspicious Turks that their existence is more of a boon for Turkey in all respects as opposed to plotting to provoke their brethren in Turkey to create a bonfire that may consume them as well in the aftermath.
