The chief of general staff strongly disagreed, saying that they (the military) refuse to talk to the Iraqi Kurdish leaders. Out of these contrasting views, what line of action is expected from the authorities? The issue is clearly a political one, and as such it is the responsibility of the government. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül’s emphasis on the primacy of politics and diplomacy in resolving the question, and his insistence on the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military, are both in line with liberal/democratic practices. This difference of opinion was dismissed by some as being a “crisis over Iraq,” but the deeper concern is that it is yet another display of disagreement over who is in charge in Ankara. While the government thinks that it is the sole legitimate authority, having the mandate of the people with the responsibility for the conduct of affairs, the military is trying to maintain at least a power to “veto.” This is certainly the civil-military relations that were supposed to be adjusted, as part of the EU reforms, to correspond to the standards of a democratic country.
Wearing his suit and not a military uniform, Gen. Büyükanit gave a speech in Washington looking more like a civilian politician, less like an army general. His statements covered issues and analysis that went far beyond the interest of a chief of general staff in any normal democratic country, governed by the rule of law. His justification for this was, not surprisingly, grounded on an evaluation that “Turkey has never faced problems, crises and risks of this magnitude, which threaten the very survival of the state.”
As I wrote last week, unless we alter this culture of insecurity -- viewing Turkey constantly threatened by outside forces -- we cannot fully function with democratic governance. The justification for a militaristic authoritarian rule has always been due to this culture of insecurity. To some in Ankara, rule by fear seems, and they are mistaken in this, easier and more effective than rule by law.
Almost anything and anybody could turn out to be threat to the regime or territorial integrity of the country, and from then on, it is not in the realm of politics but security establishment to move in to define the problem, decide on policies and act upon them. That simple!
Gen. Büyükanit was welcomed in the Washington reception of the Turkish Embassy by the cheers of Turks chanting “Rescue us, Paşam.” I wonder from whom have the Turks residing in Washington got to be rescued? From the anti-secular policies of the Bush administration? Or from the possibility of the Democratic victory in the presidential elections in the US due in 2008? Perhaps the threat of the Hispanics to the lifestyle of Turks in America. Or are they asking the Turkish military to invade the US? Of course not. It is a natural demonstration of almost genetic search for saviors whom to submit out of a traumatizing culture of fear and insecurity.
Where does the US stand on the civil-military power struggle in Turkey? Gen. Büyükanit was unusually treated by the American authorities as a potential leader of Turkey. The US administration complains about the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkey, especially among the elite. To be sure, the reformist elite have become extremely critical of the anti-liberal and security-centric policies of the US since 9/11. They have been concerned that this wave of securitization would influence Turkey too, a country already under a high degree of securitization. As a result their sympathy has gone to the EU, while the US was perceived as a country likely to support anti-democratic forces out of strategic calculations. If the US administration sends signals that is likely to pull the rug out from under the civilian government in Turkey, it should not expect any sympathy from Turkish reformists. It seems that the US continues to treat Turkey solely as a strategic asset, a country where it will do business with anyone who is “strong,” disregarding his democratic credentials.
