Prime Minister Erdogan talked of "marketing Turkey" in explaining his government's effort to attract foreign capital. To a very large extent the AK Party managed to communicate its pro-EU and pro-globalization stand to the grassroots of the party, as reflected in public opinion surveys in which pro-EU views were highest among the AK Party voters. Given the conservative, nationalist and Islamic elements amongst AK Party supporters, this was a great surprise to many. The AK Party in fact played a historic role in overcoming the traditional opposition of the conservative/nationalist/Islamic populace towards the West. That the AK Party led a rethinking of relations with the "West" has been an incredibly effective new stance outmaneuvering the state elite's historical alliance with the Western powers. As a result, while the AK Party and its conservative/Islamic periphery emerged as proponents of Turkey's engagement in globalization and EU membership, the traditional pro-Western Kemalist elite with strong representation in civilian and military bureaucracy came out as new anti-Western sectors. The Kemalists started to be a seen as advocating a model turning Turkey into an inward looking and isolated Third World country with strong anti-globalization and anti-Western views, whereas the conservative/Islamic periphery was hailed as the new "modernizers" in peace with the West, and even Westernization, along with the EU membership process. For the first time in the history of Turkish modernization the periphery (with its Islamic, conservative and nationalist elements) sided with the West in its search for greater liberties vis-à-vis an authoritarian state and state elite. Thus the "historical block" that had been formed in the early republican period between the Kemalists forces in Turkey and those Westerners who thought that the Kemalists were modernizers came to an end. The result of this "bottom-up modernization," pushed by peripheral forces and eased by the EU process, was a gradual transformation of the state as was displayed in the harmonization laws.
This is not the end of the story. The neonationalist coalition -- aligning those on the left, the right and Islamists, united by their anti-EU, anti-West and anti-globalization stances -- hit back, capitalizing on national sentiments aroused by Cyprus, the Kurdish question and the Armenian genocide claims. And in the last two years the neonationalist block has managed to influence the views of the people to some extent, thanks, among other reasons, to the visionless policies of the EU. Failing to resolve their promises on Cyprus following the referendum, meddling in the Armenian issue in a way to alienate the Turkish public and never ending questioning of Turkey's place in Europe the EU has strengthened the hand of the nationalist block.
And the government, instead of defending its historic record, seemed to give in to the demands of the nationalist block, forgetting that they have come to power not with a nationalist agenda but with a party program of "democracy and human rights." By giving in to the nationalist wave that was provoked, motivated and encouraged by anti-reform, anti-EU and anti-AK Party sentiments, the government is only preparing its own end, for the day when AK Party leaders will be held responsible by the nationalist block for "selling out" Turkey to the EU, to the United States and to global capitalism.
Embracing the nationalist block will not save the AK Party in the upcoming elections; on the contrary it would be a self-defeating strategy that would only enhance the arguments and popular standing of the neonationalists, who accuse the AK Party of betraying the "national cause."
No doubt the AK Party carries a significant nationalist sentiment among its conservative and Islamic supporters. Yet the party is also capable of moderating and balancing the nationalism of its voters with a positive stand on the EU and globalization in its perspective for a democratic and open regime in Turkey, a view, I think, still shared by the overwhelming majority of the conservative, Islamic and moderately nationalist periphery.
