We were in Munich when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in the Bayerischer Hof, where the conference took place. The initial news was positive, and there was informed speculation that the Russians might agree to abstain. When it became clear that Russia had vetoed even this soft resolution, anger at Moscow’s Syria policy reached a new zenith. Once the “disgust” settled, it became clear that Lavrov was on his way to Damascus. That happened on Tuesday.
Lavrov and Russian External Intelligence Chief Mikhail Fradkov were offered a hero’s welcome in Damascus. Most of the Russian media interpreted Fradkov’s presence as a sign that Moscow was not about to abandon its last outpost in the Middle East. Why is Russia following such a policy? First of all, Moscow wants to remind the rest of the world that it is still a superpower. Through its veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), its nukes and its energy might Russia is eager to remind the rest of the world that it is still a great power. Well, great powers have great responsibilities. One expects Moscow to show that responsibility. True, UNSC Resolution 1973 has been misused in Libya and Moscow has a point in raising that issue. However, this should not be done at the expense of Syrian lives. Moscow is betting on Assad to stay regardless.
My impressions from meetings with a number of Russian Middle East experts indicate that their assessment is that Assad will eventually survive. At the higher echelons of Russian decision-making this is not necessarily so. Lavrov knows that Assad cannot survive, but Moscow reads the Syrian crisis as a major shakeup in the geopolitics of the region. Expect more of this once Putin assumes the top helm in the Kremlin.
Ankara is extremely uncomfortable with the Russian veto. Why should we -- who have a primary stake and are directly impacted by events in Syria -- suffer the consequences of a Russian and Chinese veto? Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu is very uncomfortable with the old Cold War logic of confrontation to dominate the scene. The Syria crisis will undoubtedly add to the debate about the legitimacy and representation of the current UNSC structure.
Another word is to the United States. While Turkish policy on Syria happens to coincide with that of the US, the recent reactions toward Moscow about its veto power have inevitably reminded us about the absurd vetoes used by Washington in the past. And the list is long -- most of them pertaining to Israel.
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan indicated that Turkey will be seeking a new approach to the Syria crisis after the Russian and Chinese vetoes in the UNSC. This would most likely be a Friends of Syria or a Syria Contact Group initiative. France apparently has proposed such a group but Turkey does not consider Nicolas Sarkozy’s France a friendly country. Any move should be led by the US and Turkey along with other interested states.
US Senator Joe Lieberman openly spoke about arming the opposition in Munich. US Senator John McCain was no less forthcoming in his views on Syria. Little is expected from Lavrov’s trip to Damascus. The spotlight will inevitably turn toward a Contact Group on Syria. In the absence of heavy armor delivered to the Free Syrian Army it is highly unlikely that the regime can be beaten just by internal dynamics. It would have to be backed up by a no-fly zone that would hit targets from the air and/or a buffer zone that would serve as a refuge for opposition fighters and civilians escaping the violence. Whether this can be organized, when and how that might happen, and whether Moscow will agree to abstain in a new UNSC resolution in the coming days remains to be seen.
