It was obvious that they were being rewarded by the United States for their support. Jalal Talabani became the president of the country, and Massoud Barzani was received in the White House as the president of the Kurdish Autonomous Region. As a result of the under-representation of Arab Sunnis in the Iraqi parliament, the Kurds secured a disproportional share. Moreover, a Kurd was appointed as foreign minister and more importantly, the most vital positions in the Iraqi army were allotted to them.
The most important goal of the Kurdish leaders, who had the absolute support of the world superpower, was to expand their authority to include the oil-rich Kirkuk region through a referendum scheduled for the end of 2007.
They contended that Arabs, Shiites, Sunnis and neighboring countries - including Turkey - did not matter, if U.S. support was available. They were simply busy with expressing their gratitude for American support via the television commercials they prepared for broadcast to U.S. audiences. They even invited U.S. troops to their region.
While all was once going well, everything has changed. Kurdish leaders, who had previously expressed their satisfaction with U.S. support, started talking about the possibility that the Americans would sell them out. Bush’s defeat in the recent mid-term elections, the resignation of Rumsfeld and the recommendations of the recently released Baker-Hamilton report apparently troubled them. An article from Masrour Barzani, head of intelligence and security in the region, in the Washington Post reflected the discomfort of Kurdish leaders.
Barzani severely criticized the Baker-Hamilton report, which recommended the postponement of the Kirkuk referendum and cooperation with neighboring countries to determine the future of Iraq. He called on the U.S. administration to not follow the report’s recommendations to sacrifice Kurdish interests for the sake of the interests of neighboring countries.
Even though it still remains uncertain if the report will be transformed into concrete policy, a significant shift is already expected in relations between the Kurds. U.S. diplomatic circles closely following the process maintain that one element of change will be pertinent to the Iraqi army. Observers opined that Kurds constitute 50 percent of the Iraqi army and their strategy has been to distance themselves from the most violent areas in Iraq. When army reform is brought to the agenda, the Kurds will be asked to serve in southern and central Iraq. The Kurds will have to confront other ethnic groups of the country. If that does not happen, their weight and share of the army will inevitably be reduced to a reasonable level.
There is speculation that another Kurdish disappointment will be the Kirkuk issue. Even if they secure the annexation of Kirkuk through a referendum, in order to keep the city most desired by other Iraqi groups, they will also have to seize Mosul, Diyala and Telafer. This will mean that the Kurds will be involved in the fighting between Shiites and Sunnis. In such a case, it is hard to imagine that the United States., which is struggling with problems of its own, will support the Kurds.
The issues regarding the distribution of oil incomes are another area of contention. Because the draft law is in its final stage and it envisages central government control over oil income, this issue is expected to trigger serious discussions.
In short, the Kurdish leaders who opted to overlook reality are now required to review their policies before it is too late.
