Actually, this is at the top of the list of subjects in recent years that all foreigners trying to understand Turkey are curious. The big election victory four years ago by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has Islamic roots, undoubtedly increased this curiosity. However, it didn’t start with the AKP. It is a result of an identity crisis that was triggered by developments after the Cold War. Some of the external factors that played a role in this process were developments that took place around us, from Bosnia to Karabag, from Palestine to Iraq, and debates concerning the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. The deteriorating of leftist/secularist staffs, which became crystal clear with the ISKI (Istanbul Water and Canalization Works) scandal and the end of the monopoly the state had on radio and TV, were undoubtedly the most important internal factors that influenced this process.
Now in every crisis between the West and Turkey, curiosity regarding Turkey’s future increases a little bit. The question frequently found in opinion columns is whether or not Turkey is rapidly breaking off from the West and sliding toward the Islamic world.
Turkey tops the list of countries whose relationship has cooled with the West, particularly with American, in the wake of the Iraq War. This legtamizes the aforementioned question, especially to those who asked it. In another way, it reinforces the opinion of those who have decided that yes, Turkey is breaking away from the West. Well, what is the reality?
At this point, the research results announced yesterday by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) contain important clues. I don’t know why TESEV conducted this research, but I can guarantee that this report, which examines the religious perspective of the Turkish society, will be carefully reviewed throughout the whole world.
While this report, entitled “Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey,” supports some opinions developed in recent years regarding Turkey, it shows that the situation is too complex to be comprehended with a conventional approach. For example, one reality clearly put forth in the report is that the trend toward religiosity has increased. But when it comes down to details, it appears that it is not possible to arrive at a conclusion that political religious action is on the rise.
Actually, according to the research, while those who describe themselves as “religious” comprised 25 percent of those polled in 1999, it rose to 46.5 percent in 2006. In other words, Turkish have clearly become more religious in the last five-six years. However, while 21 percent of Turks looked favorably on the establishment of a theocracy based on the sharia law in 1999, this percentage fell to nine percent in 2006. The percentage of those not wanting the sharia rose from 68 to 76 percent during the same period.
Another finding challenging the general pattern is this: In the same period that religiosity doubled, the percentage of women not wearing a head covering rose from 25.3 to 36.5 percent. The percentage of those wearing head coverings fell from 15.7 to 11.4 percent.
So how should we read this data? And what kind of predictions should the world make for Turkey in view of these results? The evaluation made by Etyen Mahcupyan, Director of TESEV, was very meaningful. According to him, the most important result of the research is that while religiosity is increasing, religious extremism is decreasing.
While speaking with Rabbi Schneier on this subject, TESEV’s findings had not yet been announced. But I told him in summary that parallel to the general world trend in countries ranging from Israel to the United States and India, Turkey is also becoming more religious. However, religion has not remained as it was. To understand this, it is sufficient to look at the AKP’s efforts in the EU-accession process. What do you say, are we witnessing the birth of “domestic modernity”?
