There were two important social groups remaining who could threaten the Kemalists: the Muslims and the Kurds. For all the Republican history, the Muslims and the Kurds were viewed as suspicious and called “reactionary” and “separatists,” respectively, and they were forced to stay underground as a condition of this suspicion. Muslims were attempted to be secularized while Kurds were Turkified. And those who happened to be in both groups had to experience double the pressure.
One quality of the Kemalist regime was to infiltrate all its opposition groups. In this way it created its own singular opposition, even terror organizations. In terms of the terror organizations, they would create deep state projects, and reflect back the form in a way that would sweep away the energy of those struggling under the regime. Many young people, for example, when they entered into armed struggle, hoping to spark a revolution creating a socialist country, were not even aware that they had been granted employment by the state. One must accept that this was quite a malicious but functional plan. Because the state was infiltrating opposition groups movements that threatened the state it couldn’t possibly pose a true threat. For example, the rightists with leftists were given permission to murder one another before the Sept 12 coup. Things spiraled out of control and the military legitimized carrying out a coup; this was a situation they preferred because it allowed them to strengthen their power.
In short, for years now Turkey has watched the manufactured reality the Kemalist regime showed the people. Seemingly, there were political parties, political groups, underground groups and unions and while there appeared to be many choices on the street, there was only one employer and that was the state.
Muslims realized this reality in the Feb. 28, 1997 postmodern coup and they seriously distanced themselves from the Kemalist state in the way that was most correct. That is to say, they did this by discovering just how harmful the state’s created politics were. Necmettin Erbakan following in Süleyman Demirel’s footsteps was now awake to the fact that they could not bring the state around. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) spawned a revisionist consequence with economic class changes outside of the political understanding. Beneath the Kemalist government’s arguments of secularism, their biggest tool was shown to be faulty by the opening up of the world and the EU. The AK Party, little by little, increased its own base in this way and, as such, different segments of the society that wanted Turkey’s democratization, but not religion, began to support them.
But with Kurds, it was more complex than this example. After the 1980 coup, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was born out of unbelievable pressure and violence directed at the Kurds. One day we will learn of the state’s role in the PKK’s establishment and large expansion in such a short amount of time. But, even if the PKK was not fighting against the state, it was an organization that behaved just as the state wanted. The deep state acquired a shield, thanks to the war and legitimized the state’s use of violence. In a country where every day the military, militants and civilians are killed questioning the state’s rights means detention due to treason. The state resources, like “latent appropriations” and the large amount of money given to the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) with no oversight flew through various channels to the privileged segments of society. No one could question this.
On the other hand, the PKK suppressed those who advocated through civil politics the Kurdish people’s rights, labeling them enemies. They destroyed them by way of pressure or murder, in a way that was proportional to the violence that was taking place. Oppositional peacemaking Kurds were assimilated by either the state or the PKK. This occurred by killing, threats and discrediting.
And this is the short story of just why, while solving the Kurdish problem is much easier and while the value and strength of politics are much higher than in the past, the PKK and the similarly minded Peace and Democracy Party’s (BDP) have been unable to generate policies. As such, the young Turkish soldiers and the Kurdish youth continue to die for nothing. Because politics had died long ago. And as is evident, it is not permitted for it to be resurrected.
This is the function of the latest attacks.