More on coups Christian murders
 
 
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18 May 2013 Saturday
 
 
 
 
 
 
Columnists 27 July 2012, Friday 1 0 0 0
MARKAR ESAYAN
m.esayan@todayszaman.com

More on coups Christian murders

In my previous articles, I have discussed the murders of Christians in Turkey in 2006 and 2007, drawing attention to the ongoing trial into the slaughter of Christians at the Zirve publishing house in Malatya.

One particularly reason I have done this because that this case has more substantiated content and is progressing more soundly than the cases of the murder of Hrant Dink and priest Andrea Santoro. Indeed, a supplementary indictment has been submitted to the court that describes important findings by the prosecutors.

As is known, the İstanbul 14th High Criminal Court acquitted all defendants in the Dink murder case who had faced charges of being members of a criminal organization in its January 17, 2012. A supplementary indictment of 19 defendants, prepared and submitted to the Malatya Specially Authorized 3rd High Criminal Court by Malatya Specially Authorized Public Prosecutor İsmail Aksoy, in which is discussed the “abetting” and “organized” structure of the case, also reveals important links to the criminal organization behind the murders of Dink and Santoro. According to the supplementary indictment, the organization behind these murders is the same network behind the murders at Malatya’s Zirve publishing house.

This indictment has been accepted by Malatya Specially Authorized 3rd High Criminal Court. Now, the main case file of the Zirve trial may be merged with the main case file of the Kafes (Cage) action plan because the same criminal organization that was behind the murders of Dink and Santoro were responsible for the plan as well.

As I reiterated in my previous article, these murders are not independent of the coup processes that emerged in Turkey after Nov. 3, 2002, when the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) came to power.

Actually, when the Welfare Party (RP) won a remarkable success in the 1994 local elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current prime minister, was elected mayor of İstanbul, a city seen as symbol of modernity, generating great rage among neo-nationalist Kemalists. A coalition was quickly created to lay the groundwork for a coup. This process accelerated when the RP came to power by establishing a coalition with the True Path Party (DYP). At that time, an overwhelming majority of media outlets, business groups, trade unions, professional organizations and universities worked greedily and voluntarily under the coordination of pro-coup military officers in order to convince the general public and the world outside Turkey that overthrowing the government would be a legitimate act. In reality, there was neither a risk of Shariah law nor secularism at hand. However, they created this perception of Turkey in order to give the impression that the country was suffering from such problems. The efforts by media outlets were sufficient to accomplish this. Certain disgraceful acts by fake Sufi masters were exaggerated and pumped into the collective subconscious of the general public by specially selected TV anchormen who employed effects used in horror films.

Staging a postmodern coup

Indeed, this scenario really worked and the military staged through the National Security Council (MGK) on Feb. 28, 1997, what later would come to be known as a postmodern coup. In June of this same year, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned under mounting pressure. Here, I should note that then-President Süleyman Demirel -- who had been victimized by the coups of 1970 and 1980 -- made specific efforts to ensure the military would successfully overthrow the government. He was the maestro of the coup. The postmodern coup of Feb. 28 marks the darkest era in the history of Turkish democracy in terms of the actions of civilians.

Now, the Feb. 28 coup of is being investigated as well. Once-powerful generals, including Çevik Bir in particular, are now in jail. This is something that could not have been imagined 10 or even five years ago in Turkey.

It was not acceptable for the coup perpetrators that the AK Party, having sprung from the RP, came to power on Nov. 3, 2002. However, the perpetrators were not as strong as they had been at the time of the postmodern coup of Feb. 28 and could not exert unrelenting control over the media as they had done in the past. The world was changing quickly and the monopoly on information was being quickly disrupted; they had to find a way that would be more effective. Moreover, the AK Party movement had gone through a process of serious self-critiquing during the Feb. 28 coup. It had abandoned Erbakan’s state-oriented, self-isolating, anti-Western, archaic attitudes that played into the hands of the coup perpetrators. Instead, worked at an unprecedented scale to further the country’s bid to become a member of the European Union and improved ties with the US and the rest of the world. True, they were still religious, but they wouldn’t bark at the moon, and they would focus on universal values that would facilitate improved ties with other religions, cultures and nations.

Numerous coup plots were uncovered between 2003 and 2004. The military was unable to stage these coups because the outside world would see no justifiable reason for the overthrow of the government. Moreover, the police intelligence unit, established by the late President Turgut Özal as an alternative to the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the military intelligence unit, closely monitored the activities of coup perpetrators and, as we later learned, the government sent warnings to junta generals. Additionally, the chief of General Staff of the time, Gen. Hilmi Özkök, was setting up roadblocks before subversive generals.

In my opinion, being unable to stage a traditional or postmodern coup, the junta decided, at that time, to push the country towards instability, forcing the government to go away of its own volition. To this end, they needed violent acts that would bring doubt and horror to the general public. They had to undermine the legitimacy the AK Party had earned from the EU and the US, and the government had to be put behind the eight ball at home and abroad.

They devised two extremely symbolic acts that would create the impression that the AK Party and its voter base had a secret agenda to turn the country into another Iran: the assassination of secular and Christian figures.

Indeed, a person named Alparslan Arslan raided the Council of State, one of the symbols of the secular establishment, with the advertised intention of protesting the headscarf ban. A high judge -- Mustafa Bilgili -- died in the attack. However, it raised many questions. It was said that the security cameras had not been functioning during the attack, but it was later found out that they had indeed been functional but their hard disks had been manipulated. The security company that operated those cameras was affiliated with Turkey’s biggest military economic enterprise. Now, an investigation was underway. The trial stemming from the Council of State attack was merged with the case against Ergenekon, a clandestine organization nested within the state attempting to overthrow or manipulate the democratically elected government.

Priest Santoro was killed in 2006 in Trabzon and my friend, Turkish-Armenian journalist Dink, was killed in January 2007. The massacre at the Zirve publishing house came in April 2007. The message behind these assassinations was that there was a dubious religious party in office and that radical Islamists, secretly sponsored by this party, were killing secular people and Christians. Turkey, a modern secular Muslim country and favorite of the West, might at any moment turn into Iran!

Returning to the supplementary indictment in the Zirve massacre trial, the indictment claims that the murders were “committed with the intention of laying the blame on the AK Party and the Gülen movement.”

In other words, through evidence, secret witnesses and confessions, the prosecutor has reached the same conclusion we sensed when the murders were committed.

The 761-page supplementary indictment prepared by Malatya Specially Authorized Public Prosecutor İsmail Aksoy lists as defendants retired Gen. Ahmet Hurşit Tolon, former Malatya Gendarmerie Regiment commander Col. Mehmet Ülger and Maj. Haydar Yeşil as well as a number lower-ranking military officers, soldiers and civilians who worked as secret agents for an organization called the National Strategies and Operations Department of Turkey (TUSHAD), an undercover military unit.

The indictment accuses Tolon, Ülger and Yeşil of such acts as leading a terrorist organization, attempting to overthrow the government of the Turkish Republic or to prevent it from performing its duties, inciting premeditated murder, inciting the deprivation of freedom and forging official documents. The prosecutor is seeking two consecutive life sentences in solitary confinement for each with no possibility of parole.

As its most important point, the indictment states: “Given the fact that Ahmet Hurşit Tolon, a defendant in the Ergenekon trial, was in Malatya before and on the day the murders were committed, and [given] that the report by the State Audit Institution [DDK] on the murder of Hrant Dink and testimony by witness codenamed Adıyaman portend links among the murders of priest Santoro, Hrant Dink and the missionaries at the Zirve publishing house, the connection between these murders and the Ergenekon terrorist organization and this organization’s planned acts have been made clear.”

This shocking development has not been covered sufficiently by the media. However, the three symbolic trials are of crucial importance in deciphering the deep state, known as Ergenekon, founded by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) back in the 1910s.

Columnists Previous articles of the columnist
17 May 2013
No libretto for history?
15 May 2013
Why all this violence?
12 May 2013
Turkey has to grow up
10 May 2013
Polarization and deep state
8 May 2013
Turkey's dilemma
5 May 2013
Getting rid of this shame
3 May 2013
What happened in Taksim on May 1?
1 May 2013
Is 1915 genocide or what?
28 April 2013
My father
26 April 2013
It's now democratization's turn
24 April 2013
Exit from a well 1,915 meters deep
21 April 2013
How should the events of 1915 be perceived
19 April 2013
This is almost the end for Kılıçdaroğlu
17 April 2013
All that is solid melts into air
14 April 2013
Without creating new ‘others'
12 April 2013
Will anything good come from Muslims?
10 April 2013
The price CHP pays for its stance
7 April 2013
As the CHP is dragged towards euthanasia
3 April 2013
Significance of new constitution for Turkey
31 March 2013
Gökçeada Greek Primary School and ghosts from the past
29 March 2013
The butterfly effect of the solution
27 March 2013
Leyla Zana's contribution to peace
24 March 2013
Hizmet movement and the peace process
22 March 2013
As the poisonous parentheses close
20 March 2013
If there was no Ergenekon trial
18 March 2013
CHP, not Turkey, will be partitioned
15 March 2013
Redeeming democracy
13 March 2013
CHP and peace
10 March 2013
The big peace gong has not rung yet
6 March 2013
Chemistry of and roadblocks to solution
3 March 2013
The provocations that have come to nothing
1 March 2013
When will big peace come?
27 February 2013
Kurdish politics on a test drive
24 February 2013
Logic of peace
22 February 2013
Are we really getting closer to peace?
20 February 2013
Transformation of nationalism
17 February 2013
Kurds, Muslims and neo-nationalists
15 February 2013
The CHP's İmralı ‘correction'
13 February 2013
Baykal coup in the CHP
10 February 2013
The dignity of politics and the deep state
8 February 2013
Opportunity for urban transformation
6 February 2013
Getting rid of the straitjacket
3 February 2013
Problems exhausted too
1 February 2013
Turkey's CHP problem
30 January 2013
Turkish issue and the CHP
27 January 2013
Kılıçdaroğlu's choice
25 January 2013
Why can't we postpone the reforming of the state?
23 January 2013
Paris killings and their wake
20 January 2013
A tough week
18 January 2013
Dink case and democratization
16 January 2013
Post-PKK Turkey
13 January 2013
The PKK issue and provocations
11 January 2013
Supreme Court head prosecutor: Dink killed by an organization
9 January 2013
Tragedy in Zonguldak
6 January 2013
The new process
2 January 2013
While the deep state waits…
30 December 2012
Polarization and stability
28 December 2012
The state apparatus resurfaced
26 December 2012
What is deep state?
23 December 2012
Coup changes appearance
19 December 2012
Human rights struggle in the new age
16 December 2012
As the state tries itself
14 December 2012
Search for common sense in AK Party
12 December 2012
What were in those reports?
9 December 2012
Let us make sure history does not repeat itself
7 December 2012
Turkey in past decade and past week
5 December 2012
The Kurdish issue and populism
2 December 2012
Turkey: a country of paradoxes
30 November 2012
What is Turkey’s role in the imminent comeback of the East?
28 November 2012
Why can’t we make a new constitution?
25 November 2012
Özal: Once again
23 November 2012
Where does Kenan Evren’s self-confidence come from?
21 November 2012
Gaza and three possibilities
18 November 2012
Price of delay: paid
16 November 2012
Mastering time and price of delay
14 November 2012
Death penalty debate and questions
11 November 2012
Golden Age or Stone Age?
9 November 2012
Key to a victory: politics of non-deception
7 November 2012
A radical package
4 November 2012
Özal and the Kurdish issue
2 November 2012
Changing the factory settings: thoughts on the AK Party and the Turkish Republic
31 October 2012
Continued reforms or chaos?
28 October 2012
Hunger strikes and political constriction
24 October 2012
Link between economy and democracy
21 October 2012
Murder of Christian missionaries and the deep state
19 October 2012
The importance of coup trials
17 October 2012
Why is EU membership important?
14 October 2012
We could have shared the Nobel
12 October 2012
EU progress report and recent times in Turkey
10 October 2012
A deus ex machina: Recep Güven
7 October 2012
No to war… but
5 October 2012
Turkish foreign policy and Syria
3 October 2012
Differences between two speeches
30 September 2012
Turkey's red lines
26 September 2012
Post Balyoz, pressure mounts on Court
23 September 2012
Turkey's future and the Balyoz decision
21 September 2012
Turkey’s military problem
19 September 2012
Kılıçdaroğlu’s Menderes visit
16 September 2012
Film provocation as the East returns
14 September 2012
Uludere, Syria, Şemdinli and the state
...