Of course, the escalation in Israel’s rhetoric over the last couple of months could still be sheer bluff to impress Tehran and the rest of the world. But I got an uncomfortable feeling when I noticed that all but one of the Republican candidates for the US presidency basically support the Israeli approach and, after all the talk of war, 75 percent of Americans believe Iran is already capable of using a nuclear bomb (which, according to all experts, it is not). I could not help thinking of 2003 and the alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that were used as the main argument for an invasion. On top of that, many analysts expect that, in the run-up to the November elections, President Obama will find it difficult to clearly and openly denounce an Israeli attack and run the risk of being portrayed as weak by his belligerent opponent. So the question is: If not war, what then do we want?
The Economist had a go at it in this week’s edition. The magazine made a forceful argument against bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities. It will only delay -- not stop -- Iran and will make the country more determined to build a nuclear weapon and more dangerous when it gets one. The conclusion of the influential weekly: “Short of occupation, the world cannot eliminate Iran’s capacity to gain the bomb. It can only change its will to possess one. Just now that is more likely to come about through sanctions and diplomacy than war.”
On sanctions, a growing number of observers agree that the new round of measures will definitively badly hurt the Iranian economy but will not convince the regime to stop with its nuclear program. The only available option with at least some chance of success seems to be old-fashioned diplomacy. And there Turkey comes in -- at least according to some.
Last week, the International Crisis Group (ICG) presented a new report on Iran’s nuclear program. I would recommend everybody read the balanced assessment of the ICG and its proposal for a negotiated solution based on Turkey’s past experiences and present potential. At the heart of the paper is a reconstruction of the Turkish-Brazilian effort in 2010 to strike a deal with Iran that resulted in the so-called Tehran Declaration. At the time, the agreement was swept aside by the US and the EU, although the content reflected many of the demands that Washington had put on the table only six months before. It turned out the US had given up on diplomacy then and had opted exclusively for sanctions. Turkey and Brazil felt betrayed and were astonished and angry. Both voted against a new round of trade bans in the UN Security Council.
That was almost two years ago and in the meantime, things have moved on. Because of Syria and the NATO missile shield, relations between Ankara and Tehran are not that cozy anymore. The US needs Turkey to bring down Syrian mass murderer Bashar al-Assad and to counter Iranian dominance in Iraq. Now is a good moment to reflect upon the most effective strategy on Iran that could avoid an Israeli attack that both Obama and Prime Minister Erdoğan don’t want.
The ICG suggests a return to the spirit of the 2010 Tehran Declaration: 1. Accept Iran’s right to nuclear research, enrichment, production and the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes; 2. Force Iran to accept a rigorous monitoring system; 3. Revise the figures but stick to the mechanism that was agreed upon in 2010 to deal with Iran’s nuclear stockpile. Above all, the US and the EU should accept the crucial role in new negotiations of emerging, non-traditional powers, such as Turkey, Brazil and South Africa, that are more trusted by Iran.
Would such a process guarantee success? No, it would not. But it would absolutely be preferable to a war that would rock the region and sanctions that don’t work.
