Recent comments and reports argue that Assad may survive longer than earlier expected. Apart from the international support he enjoys, Assad has been very successful at keeping the army and bureaucracy united. But that should not be surprising. What is called “the Syrian state” is essentially a huge security apparatus. Not only during periods of crisis, but even in normal times, since the early 1970s, a security mentality has dominated state-society relations in Syria. The mechanisms of the Syrian security apparatus are not clear-cut. That apparatus is a conglomeration of overlapping state institutions that include many social organizations. Thus, the Assad regime knows even the miniscule details of its society.
A second critical fact is the failure of the Syrian opposition to gain the support of the middle class, which includes the Sunni families. Unlike the Libyan or Egyptian opposition, the Syrian opposition comes across as a very low-profile, unorganized group that puts at risk the established interests of the Syrian middle class.
Returning to Turkey's position: It has been clear from the very beginning that Turkey has striven to maintain a moral stance on the Syrian issue, despite the cost. Thus, on a moral level, it is hardly possible to criticize Turkish foreign policy on Syria. However, the key question is located elsewhere: Could Turkey have devised a moral perspective different from the current one that would have given it better leverage as a contributor to the resolution of the Syrian crisis? Two points deserve special attention here:
First, Turkey was too quick off the mark on Syria. In less than two months, Turkey had declared its full strategy, which, ironically, marginalized Ankara in the eyes of the Syrian regime. Turkey could have moved much more slowly and avoided the rapid actions and declarations that wrecked its close relationship with the Syrian regime. Today, Ankara's moral stance looks good, but it exists at the expense of its capacity to contribute positively to events in Syria.
Secondly, Turkey could have formulated a more effective discourse. Leading Turkish statesmen have criticized Assad very harshly. Did that work? No. Actually, it is very rare for statesmen to be persuaded by the advice of other states' leaders. Keeping open a corridor to the Assad regime, no matter how narrow, might have been the better alternative.
It has been crystal clear since its early days that the Syrian crisis is not like any preceding one in the region and that it would last longer than those did. Interestingly, despite these early signs, Turkey came up with a radical and short-term strategy. Ankara's expectation was probably that the Assad regime would soon be toppled, as were the regimes of the other Arab states. However, words and actions are decisive in foreign policy, and Turkey is now hemmed in by its own, with the result that it has no alternative but to push for regime change in Syria.
It is noteworthy that for the first time since its creation in 1923 Turkey has set itself on a route as ambitious as this one. Historically speaking, it is not habitual Turkish foreign policy to demand regime change in a neighboring state. Naturally, the risks in making such a demand are clear: If you fail, you lose your neighbor's neighborly regard.
