The arrest warrants for the four leading figures in MİT are pending. The fifth one, the one about Hakan Fidan, the head of MİT, is not an arrest order, but an open, urgent demand that he gives his “testimony” (still defined as a “suspect”) to the special prosecutors in Ankara.
Meanwhile, in addition to two key police chiefs some days ago, nine more highly placed police officers were removed from duty in İstanbul, effective immediately (by order of the Interior Ministry).
On the political scene, turmoil is next door. In order to save Fidan and extend his immunity, the government is today to launch a massive move in Parliament to amend Article 26 of the so-called MİT Law. Roughly formulated, it will give the head of the government special status whether or not to “approve” permission for “allegations of crimes committed by those who are part of the staff of or affiliated with MİT for the conduct of the special duties given by the prime minister.” Expect a new political storm around this one. In such cases of massive crisis, it is a luxury for any fair-minded journalist to be dragged into various camps cheering events on. Camps that may look inviting may only be traps to distort the bigger picture.
At the moment, Ankara has become the setting for a destructive chain reaction. There is growing arm wrestling taking place in the camp wherein nothing else matters other than debates about the Kurdish issue and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Here there is no referee; only calls for sound reason.
As wide as the disagreements are on the methods of dealing with the Kurdish issue and the long-overdue restructuring of domestic intelligence and patterns of “covert action in the homeland,” it is as easy for the sworn enemies of the transformation process and devotees of bureaucratic tutelage to once more rise up and start meddling in politics. The question raised in this column has been whether they have not already done that.
Almost 10 years of Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule (with unchanged voter support) means enormous power accumulation, endorsed also by the vacuum of an efficient, rational, far-sighted opposition. The main point that cuts through this crisis is to what extent this power will be used benevolently for reform, or whether it will be abused and wasted in an internal power struggle.
Errors of judgment have followed each other during the crisis. It began with the judiciary and continues now with the politicians. It was a mistake by the special prosecutors to call MİT’s top figures for interrogation as “suspects,” and insist that the “arrest orders” remain, without informing their superiors.
In Fidan’s case, in my humble opinion, they have misinterpreted the law: They should have informed the office of the prime minister. For this, they should also have considered MİT’s special status and the context of the crisis that envelops Iran, Iraq, Syria. They have miscalculated that the inquiry, which they led, has some parts that overlap with critical, political decision making -- be that the Oslo process or KCK operations.
Certainly, no state institution can enjoy impunity in Turkey. This includes MİT. The claims made public by the special prosecutors actually raise suspicions that some things are out of control; and they are serious. But, this crisis shows that special prosecutors probing this utterly sensitive case must tread much more delicately -- not like elephants in a glasshouse. They have shown shortcomings in that.
Now, as what we can see as a political response, the government is determined to make an even more serious mistake. The amendment to the MİT Law is bound to create big risks in political terms and a backlash in the judicial sphere. Giving a prime minister special power before special prosecutors means overstepping the independence of the judiciary. It may pave the way for making accountability for the state an even more distant dream. It rings “old Turkey” all over.
This crisis, which if it were only due to human error could be avoided, drags Turkey into the depths of more tail chasing. I have, however, already made it clear earlier in this column that the dark elements are again in motion.
Soon enough, we will face the results. On the Kurdish side, tensions will rise. A lot of energy that could be spent for modernizing the apparatus of intelligence will be wasted. Institutional rifts will deepen. With the reshuffle within the police, the risks for terror acts will rise.
And given that the walls are getting higher and communication weaker in Parliament, it will be very, very difficult -- if not impossible -- to pass a new constitution. We all know who and which circles would be very happy to see that not happening. But that is the way it is, sadly.
