The secret service and the judiciary drew their swords and engaged in battle, which undeniably indicates that the state is divided over the Kurdish issue. Who will win this war? At the very least, we can say that the winner will achieve a pyrrhic victory.
There are reports that the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) resumed its terrorist attacks after a hiatus attributable to heavy winter conditions. Cemil Bayık, a PKK leader, is threatening to launch terrorist attacks against metropolitan cities. The magnitude and wantonness of the row within the state stems from the limited time left to make a clear decision.
The various sides confronting each other over the Kurdish issue should be seen as factions involved in a power struggle. The military has started to loosen its grip on politics, but the resulting vacuum is so big neither the democratically elected government nor the legislature can fill it. Having attained greater autonomy after the latest constitutional reforms, the judiciary is trying to fill this void by creating a powerful political front. The complicated nature of the Kurdish issue is further crystallizing the polarization between the secret service and the judiciary. The groups wielding power within the state are once again becoming highly polarized as a result of the Kurdish issue. This, in turn, is creating a new balance of power within the state.
In fact, there are multiple factions involved, but the confrontation has gathered them into two major groups. The first group believes that the Kurdish issue cannot be solved without first finding a solution to the terrorism issue. If the state conducts an effective struggle against PKK terrorism while staying within legal boundaries and if the organization’s domination over the Kurds can be eliminated, the Kurdish issue will become a manageable problem. To this end, the state must fulfill its duties and destroy the PKK and its affiliates, such as the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). This view automatically brings security-oriented policies to the fore. The second group prefers the political solution, which includes taking into consideration the psychology of the organization and people in the region, trying to convince the PKK to lay down its arms and, to this end, negotiating with the PKK and the people of the Southeast. The first view is generally adopted by the judiciary while the second is purported by the government, including in particular the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). This polarization has been quite obvious to those who closely monitor the developments concerning the Kurdish issue. Still, no one expected such a harsh confrontation.
If we look at the matter solely from the perspective of the Kurdish issue, which view is correct? Or which view is capable of settling the Kurdish issue? Personally, I think we need both of them. The rule of law should function, but at the same time, the psychology of this issue should be managed with a great deal of flexibility. There should be a middle way.
An equally important row is taking place between the PKK and the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). BDP members are raising their voices against the PKK leadership in the Kandil Mountains in order to try and settle the issue through negotiation. They are proposing jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, who was previously sidelined by Kandil, as the one with whom the state may conduct negotiations. It must be for this reason that Aysel Tuğluk, the mouthpiece of the BDP wing in favor of negotiations, quickly made a statement and lent support to MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan and the MİT team.
Summoning the MİT undersecretary to testify as a “suspect” runs counter to the principle of the administration maintaining a party line. Moreover, no one army in this battle will win by dominating everything. How will this row affect the Kurdish issue? The polarization within the state will trigger necessary debates within the PKK/BDP camp.
