The reasons for these results are evident in the MetroPOLL study: 71 percent of respondents found the foreign policy of the AKP to be successful, whereas 69 percent believe that the party has done well for the economy. Had a question on healthcare been asked, the result would have been even more striking. In short, the AKP administration is supported by more than its normal base of voters in its basic policies. While only 30 percent believed that Turkey was doing well in early 2010, this increased to 54 percent by the end of 2011. Moreover, only 15 percent said 2012 will be worse than the previous year; 54 percent argued that it will be better.
You may think that these indicators are related to daily standards of living of the people and that, in terms of fundamental freedoms, Turkey is not doing fine. Turkish votes suggest otherwise. Around a quarter, 24 percent, of the respondents believed that democracy was undermined in 2011, whereas 43 percent said Turkey experienced an increase in democracy. Eighty-one percent of those who believe that Turkey has made advances in democracy voted for the AKP. However, those who held that democracy was eroded in the same year constitute 51 percent of the votes cast for opposition parties. In other words, at least 19 percent of AKP voters are uncomfortable with the current course of events. However, at least 49 percent of the people who voted for the opposition parties believe that democracy has improved despite everything. This means that the opposition claims to support freedom but they fail to meet the needs of their voters.
On the other hand, it is obvious that not everything is fine in Turkey. Everybody is aware of the barriers preventing freedom of expression, lengthy periods of detention, the lack of fair trials and the police methods in the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) operations, where the legitimate cannot be distinguished from the illegitimate. The Andy-Ar study reveals that the primary reason that voters did not cast a ballot for the AKP was the style and attitudes of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. These respondents noted that the AKP leader shows some dictatorial tendencies and that he tries to destroy his opponents. In short, there is an apparent problem relating to freedom. Otherwise, if only the services put forth were considered, the ruling party would have secured 60 percent of the vote. However, this did not take any support away from the AKP. The vast majority believe that the reasons for the current state of success include the ruling party’s successful fight against Ergenekon and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and the conviction that only the AKP may be able to fix these problems.
In this case, the question is this: Considering that there are visible legal measures limiting freedom of expression in Turkey, why is the opposition unable to use this opportunity to increase its votes? Let us look at why voters did or did not prefer these parties: 75 percent of people who supported the CHP noted that they acted out of ideological reasons, whereas 17 listed anti-AKP sentiments as their motive. These reasons make up 77 percent and 18 percent, respectively, for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). While the similarities between these two parties are striking, the actual problem is that the opposition parties are trapped into increasingly conservative ideological attitudes that cannot offer a bright future. It is hard to foresee that Kemalism and Turkish nationalism could bring peace and stability in Turkey and that they could take the standards of freedom of expression to a point beyond those created by the AKP.
On the other hand, it is essential to note that the CHP and the MHP do not share exactly the same position because 40 percent of the people who did not vote for the MHP say that, first and foremost, they do not believe that this party would become successful. In other words, the MHP appears to be an outdated party; however, findings reveal that if it improves its discourse, it may attract the votes of some religious people. On the other hand, the primary reason listed by those who did not vote for the CHP was the party ideology (42 percent). This figure increases to 67 percent if you add the party’s perceived opposition to religion and religiosity. This means that the CHP is a Kemalist party with authoritarian secularist tendencies; from this perspective, independently of its performance, this party is seen as redundant and meaningless.
This outlook shows that the AKP attracts support despite setbacks and poor performance in some areas, and that people express their demand for democracy through the AKP. Before I finish, let me revisit the question of the bid for EU membership from the surveys: Nationwide, 51 percent of respondents support EU membership; support increases to 64 percent among the AKP voters, whereas it decreases to 36 percent among CHP supporters.
