The demilitarization that started by abolishing the “unofficial government” function of the National Security Council (MGK) -- a first step in terms of demilitarization taken within the scope of European Union reforms -- has today reached to over 58 generals, including the ones on active duty and a former chief of General Staff now on trial. The group with the last word in the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) is no longer the military cast but the elected government. The Oct. 29 Republic Day celebration was reduced to a single and civil ceremony. Şemdinli Prosecutor Ferhat Sarıkaya, who was barred the minute he prosecuted the military, has now been reinstated. An investigation into the Internet memorandum of April 27, 2007, which involves another former chief of General Staff, potential investigation of the Feb. 28, 1997 military coup and the army’s privileges, including the influential Turkish Armed Forces Assistance Center (OYAK), are in the spotlight. All these judicial and symbolic attempts, and the consequences of these on political life, have a vital function in determining Turkey’s democratic future. These attempts aren’t limited only to the domination of the army by the present government but go much further. They have a bearing on representative democracy, as shown in the results of the 2007 and 2011 elections. They drive the Kemalist tradition back, and they are foremost supported by a societal interface.
Within this context, the judicial processes that have been initiated against the actors of the Sept. 12, 1980 military coup constitute a vital stage of demilitarization endeavors. Read together with the abolishment of the “militarized nation” celebrations of the “May 19 Youth and Sports Day” and the end of national security classes in colleges, we understand that now demilitarization has reached another dimension. The Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government not only resorts to jurisdiction in political interventions of the military targeting elected officials, but it also takes steps that can increase the scope of demilitarization and thus, that of democracy.
This, in time, can invalidate the impression and perception that the government is generally in agreement with the judicial, political and administrative structures of the regime put in place after the 1980 coup. I say “can invalidate” because we still have a long way to go. There is a lot of work that may take decades to achieve in terms of demilitarization. However, touching Sept. 12, 1980 means spreading demilitarization throughout the country and starting to besiege the army, which meddles in politics. The Sept. 12, 1980 case is a fresh opportunity for democratization, which started to stumble, insofar as it relates to all society, not just the AK Party. This military coup, which was prepared, similar to bad copies of it that emerged recently, and turned out to be successful, is altogether an operation of malice and persecution, with its 1982 constitution and its hundreds of anti-democratic laws, thousands of regulations, thousands of detentions and unanswered murders. Bearing in mind that more than half of Turkey’s population was born after the military coup, it will be useful to bring up some hard figures from the balance sheet of this huge, countrywide violation of rights, freedoms and law: 650,000 people were taken into custody; 1,683,000 people were blacklisted; 210,000 court cases were opened; 517 death sentences were given and 50 were executed; 388,000 passport applications were rejected; 14,000 citizens were denaturalized; over 100,000 citizens became political refugees; 937 films were prohibited; 24,000 associations were banned; 4,000 teachers and 1,000 academics were dismissed; trade unions were banned; 39 tons of newspapers and magazines were destroyed; and a publication ban was implemented for newspapers for hundreds of days…
I repeat, the Sept. 12, 1980 case is a vital chance for Turkey in terms of demilitarization, social peace and true democratization. The judgment of military coup organizers, the overturning of unfair verdicts, reinstatement of and compensation for victims, together with a legal and constitutional overhaul would have the potential of breaking the very foundations of the regime put in place after the coup. This full-size reassessment normally takes years, just like in the demilitarization processes of Greece, Portugal and Spain, and unless the army is put under full civilian control, with the weapon in its hands, it will always be a threat, ready to rise again at any time. Finally, in a country like Turkey where the army is still not under full civilian control, protracted conflicts like the Kurdish and Cyprus situations would make military control quasi-permanent in political life.
