First there is the debate inside Europe. No European country would oppose the idea that nuclear proliferation or radical Islamist regimes are serious threats and that the missile shield should be used against them. However, a number of European countries would oppose the idea that Russia, too, may be one of this system’s targets. The disagreement on this matter is already palpable between the UK and Germany. The UK believes that as long as Russia does not become a close partner with NATO, it may turn into the “other” sooner or later, and London is not disturbed by the fact that Russians feel the missile shield is directed against them. Nevertheless, Germany faces a dilemma. It definitely does not need to make the Russians angry, neither does it need to damage its cooperation with the Americans. At the same time, Germany is not unhappy with the fact that Eastern European countries, and particularly Poland, are still uncomfortable with Russia and that their concerns about their Eastern neighbor push them closer to Germany.
Another aspect of this debate is about the data this system will collect: Who is going to see it, assess it and make any necessary decisions? The problem is that not all NATO members are in the EU and vice versa. This debate probably makes some wonder why Turkey is still not a part of the EU.
The missile defense system will have serious implications for Russian foreign policy. Some segments in Russia consider the radar system not as a threat but as an opportunity to launch renewed cooperation with NATO. They expect their country to work with NATO and the US in order to extend Russia’s room to maneuver on a global scale. They suggest that Iran’s nuclear efforts, Assad’s massacres, Pakistan’s “Talibanization” and Afghanistan’s instability are threatening Russia as well and, in the end, it is China that benefits from this situation.
However, there are others in Russia who perceive the missile shield to be a direct threat to Russian interests as they believe the system is there to balance Russian-Chinese rapprochement, to limit Russian influence over Iran and to control its cooperation with Europe. They also seem quite worried that Turkey will host this system’s components and ask where Turkey’s place is in the global strategic configuration. Oddly, they don’t ask this question of Turkey but of the EU.
It is impossible to know yet how this system will really function, what its concrete targets will be or whether or not it will actually achieve something. Perhaps the system’s real purpose is to motivate countries to make strategic decisions. Differently from the Bush administration, US President Barack Obama has been using this system to reinforce ties with the EU and is not threatening Russia.
Besides, he prefers the latter to cooperate with the US directly rather than through Europe. We should note that the US is perfectly aware of and unhappy with the EU’s plans to use Russia to balance out US influence and prevent the US from becoming the dominating force behind the missile shield. Russia wouldn’t normally oppose the idea of using Europe as a buffer zone with the US. However, today’s global issues do not make such a buffer zone meaningful or useful. The real problems are in the Middle East, and this region’s future will also affect the balances in the Far East. That’s why the Mediterranean is merely a corridor to the Russians.
In all cases, the missile defense system will redefine global power balances and redistribute the cards. Under these circumstances, it is urgent to discuss, inside and outside the country, why Turkey still remains outside the EU.
