The international media has narrowed its focus, and analysis and judgment has been concentrated on Moscow's role in the delays. The key question here is why Russia opposes the UNSC resolution, whether is it true that Moscow perceives Syria as its political “lebensraum” (living space) in the Middle East. A recent history of Syrian-Russian relations gives a better sense of the underlying dynamic at play.
For starters, it is uncontroversial to state that relations between the two countries were not particularly close during the first half of the past decade. During this time, Moscow sought to play a greater role in the Arab-Israeli peace process, believing that the Syrians were the only ones with a strong claim to a leading role in the peace process. However, Syria had different ideas about how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria boycotted a February 2000 meeting in Moscow of the Multilateral Steering Group of Middle East Peace. Then in March 2002, when Russia along with 13 other UNSC members voted in favor of Resolution 1397, calling for coexistence via an Israeli and a Palestinian state, Syria abstained. Although both countries opposed the US intervention in Iraq and the UNSC resolution that followed, there has been no suggestion on Russia's part that Moscow would do anything to protect Syria if an “Iraq” scenario were to happen there.
However, despite this rocky start to the decade Russian-Syrian relations improved dramatically after Bashar Assad met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in January 2005, when Russia signed an agreement to sell an advanced air defense missile system to Syria over US and Israeli objections. Relations between Moscow and Damascus have grown stronger since, even though Syria's position as an international player has become increasingly tenuous following the UNSC's approval of Resolution 1559 in September 2004, which called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon. Notably, Russia did not vote in favor of this resolution. However, the US intervention in Iraq, pressure on Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and the assassination of the Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in 2005 have all heightened Damascus's sense of insecurity -- which has in turn increased its incentive to turn to Moscow.
Now, Moscow is trying to convince the international community to give the Syrian regime one more chance. There are several motivating factors at play here, in addition to the aforementioned developments in Russian-Syrian relations.
On one hand, if Syria arrives at a post-Assad period, it could improve its relations with neighboring countries, which would in turn weaken Russia's economic position in Syria. Russian business investments in Syrian infrastructure, energy and tourism amount to nearly $20 billion.
On the other hand, if a fundamentalist regime were to come to power in Damascus, Russia risks losing its contracts, investments and other benefits -- particularly the strategically located Syrian maritime port of Tartus, first used by the USSR as a supply hub during the Cold War, in addition to Latakia, Syria's second largest port, where it has a smaller base.
The most obvious reason for Russia's resistance to drastic change in Syria is that any such shifts would threaten Moscow's strategic position, economic interests and political ambiguity in the Middle East. Moscow felt that it was cheated by the UNSC regarding events in Libya; Russia supported the UNSC's no-fly zone resolution on Libya, but then following its implementation claimed that Western countries manipulated the wording of the resolution and made it a platform for regime change, which in turn paved the way for NATO intervention. Russia also alleged that the NATO-led coalition violated the UN Resolution on Libya, thereby reducing prospects of a peaceful settlement. Thus, Moscow believes that any possible UNSC decisions on Syria would give rise to a repetition of the Libyan scenario, and the economic losses incurred in Libya were an important lesson for Russia. According to Anatoly Isaikin, general director of Russian defense export giant Rosoboronexport, Russia lost $4 billion in the defense sector alone, due to the loss of arms contracts with Libya (following the UN's arms shipments embargo).
Moreover, Russia sees Syria as an opportunity to take part in “rebuilding the Middle East” by participating in peace talks. In response to offers from Moscow, the Syrian regime has indicated that it is open to “informal” talks with opposition leaders in Moscow. But, as observed in the media, the Syrian opposition says the Syrian National Council did not receive any formal invitation to attend talks with Syrian authorities in Russia and would in any case decline. Russia understands that Assad's days are over and is considering how to safeguard its position in the region. This is why they support a controlled exit (of Assad). If the Syrian opposition agrees to talks in Moscow with the incumbent Syrian regime, Moscow will likely maintain its economic and strategic position in Syria in the post-Assad period.
Furthermore, the Russian government has accused the US and other Western countries of encouraging anti-Putin protests and funding opposition movements. They have been disappointed by the comparisons being drawn by the Western media between recent protests in Russia and the Arab Spring revolutions. While the West has seen its own grassroots protests (for example, the “Occupy” protests in the US and UK), these actions can scarcely be compared to the Arab Spring revolutions -- but nonetheless Russia has argued that the West is in no position to criticize or comment, let alone intervene in Russian domestic affairs.
Saturday's vetoes clearly indicate that this issue is linked to the Iran question. China and Russia, who sit on the 5+1 group negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program, have opposed the oil embargo against Iran: China imports about 700,000 barrels of oil per day from Iran. Both countries have an interest in checking US influence in the Middle East and Central Asia and have been developing strong strategic relationships with Iran.
While it may be that no one really expects Russia to pull back on its Syrian interests, if the Assad regime continues to perpetrate the killings of innocent civilians, Moscow risks incurring a degree of “by-proxy” responsibility. Moreover, Russia risks losing public support in Syria; the current situation may well be portrayed as “Russia's negative attitude towards Syrian citizens,” which again runs counter to Moscow's interests. But if the antagonism between Russia and the West continues to play out on the Syrian stage, the civilian death toll will rise, and no one will have any grounds for blaming anyone else.
