I sat in on this meeting. Four years ago, I heard directly from the Kurdish politician that Öcalan must be accepted as party to the negotiations. As I listened to Aysel Tuğluk, Ahmet Türk and Sırrı Sakık, I learned what solution they had offered to the Kurdish issue and how they explained their argument that a solution was not possible without negotiating with Öcalan. This was the reason why I felt I was traveling back in time as I listened to the speakers at Sunday’s meeting. Why were they repeating the same things four years later?
During this period of four years, Öcalan was accepted as an interlocutor and negotiations were maintained with him. This was one of the details that was not mentioned at this meeting. The state conducted negotiations with Öcalan, who is currently serving a life sentence on İmralı Island in the Sea of Marmara. Also, based on voice recordings concerning the negotiations held between the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and the PKK in Oslo, the state also provided communication between the PKK and Öcalan. As a result of these negotiations, the state and Öcalan reached a three-item agreement as Öcalan announced during his meetings with his lawyers on July 8 of last year.
However, on July 14, the PKK staged an attack in Silvan, effectively destroying this agreement between the state and Öcalan. With this attack, the PKK made it clear that it did not accept this agreement. To cut a long story short, it was the PKK that undermined the negotiations between Öcalan and the state. As we learned from the above-mentioned meeting between Öcalan and his lawyers, Öcalan was very angry about the attack. He even accused the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) of blackmailing him. He harshly criticized PKK executives and even used insults and bad language to refer to them.
Given this disagreement and confrontation between Öcalan and the PKK, why has the BDP brought another Öcalan-centered solution to the agenda? This question can be explained with reference to the nature of the Kurdish political movement and to the internal competition within it. This competition is between the armed wing and the civilian political wing. The armed wing does not want to give up its weapons, which it sees as being what makes it what it is. The civilian political wing, on the other hand, believes that the Kurdish issue can no longer be settled with the use of weapons and wants guns to be silenced. For a civilian solution, the BDP pointed to Öcalan. By using Öcalan’s prestige among Kurds, it is trying to convince the armed wing.
The problem has largely amounted to a psychological trauma. An environment of mutual trust should be created. The PKK’s Silvan attack made the solution impossible and created disappointment with the government. The government does not see the PKK as a reliable interlocutor. The lack of trust in the PKK is the main reason for the continuation and expansion of police operations against the KCK. Whether this lack of mutual trust can be overcome depends largely on the steps the PKK/BDP camp will take. What this step should be was clearly and simply formulated by Cengiz Çandar at the Sunday meeting: The PKK’s declaring a cease-fire unconditionally and for an indefinite time. This is really the only step that can untangle the failed process.
There are intelligence reports that the PKK will escalate violence on Feb. 15. This is the main reason why the government intensified the operations. This is the most effective method by which the PKK can force the government to stop the operations and agree to hold negotiations. I assume it does not have any other alternative as the tide is turning against the PKK in the Middle East. Only with a cease-fire can Öcalan’s role be given a chance.
