Of course, this process of change and transformation mainly concerns the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general. As veteran journalist Cengiz Çandar noted at a conference in Cairo, "The developments that occurred so far in this process can only form the introductory part of a thick history book." Although they are today considered as very important and significant, the incidents that occurred during the Arab Spring that started on Dec. 17, 2010 will be given possibly less space in the history textbooks that will be written 50 years down the line. For the time being, it is not clear who will be entitled to write the history after successfully emerging from the history-making process. Therefore, we don't have the ability to predict the content that will make it into these textbooks. Still, an analysis of the elements that have made their impact on this historic process of change and transformation may give us hints as to future trends.
While it is certainly the most important development in the region in recent years, the Arab Spring is not the only reality in the region. Other elements that are affected by and that have the potential to affect the Arab Spring should be taken into consideration as well. Any assessment of the process of change in Egypt will be flawed if it is done without considering its potential effect on the country's relations with Israel and the West. I think no one can deny the Shiite presence and rising Shiite influence, including Iran's part in it, and its cooperation with the administration in Damascus, as the most obvious reason for the lack of a concerted internal effort to stop the ongoing massacres in Syria. We should also note that there are signs that despotic or semi-authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world tend to implement new restrictive or repressive processes with fears and concerns triggered by ongoing developments in the Arab world.
An article by Turkish Religious Affairs Directorate President Mehmet Görmez, published in the Zaman daily on Jan. 10, 2012, successful points at two extremist components of this dangerous course of developments. "As we evaluate the background of the political reflexes, tensions and conflicts in the immediate vicinity of our country, we cannot ignore the part religion plays in them," writes Professor Görmez, adding strikingly, "Some religious groups and approaches that seek to compete with each other in the region have, by all means, eye-catching roles in international politics."
In this important article, Görmez further suggests: "In our close environment, there are renewed efforts to implement the historical plan to divide Islam. Sectarian differences are being used as a basis for the intended political and geographical divisions. Moreover, in this process, we should not ignore the efforts by an Islamic ideology -- which has, as a byproduct of modern times, severed religious texts from daily realities and turned them into soulless books on law -- to replace Sunni Islam. In this context, both Shiite and Sunni actors are seeking to expand their roles, positions and influence, taking into consideration regional power balances. Sects and religious affiliations, each of which relies on different interpretations of Islam, particularly as seen in the case of Shiism and Salafism, have been trying to publicly advertise themselves as a superior representation of Islam."
As Mr. Görmez unerringly pointed out, the Muslim world, and in particularly the Middle East, is suffering from a process in which two extremist ideologies that claim to have exclusive right to represent Islam compete with each other. And unfortunately, the wrong policies the US and the West have pursued knowingly or unknowingly in the region have certainly played a great role in empowering these two extremist poles.
I think no one can deny the fact that the new geopolitical structure that emerged in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and of Iraq in 2003 had played into the hands of Iran, a country which eventually made Shiite expansion the main axis of its national policy. It goes without saying that the Shiite Crescent that extends from the Persian Gulf to the East Mediterranean and that has become a major source of worry and fear among Sunni Arabs is largely an American product.
The extreme armament of the Gulf countries, and in particular of Saudi Arabia, whose defense expenditures amount to hundreds of billions of dollars, has obviously urged Iranians to perceive this development as a threat, which in turn has led even reformists and moderate groups in Iran to band together with the radical policies of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The rising Shiite dominance in Iraqi politics, the impact of Hezbollah on the Lebanese political scene, and the support Iran and Iraqi Shiites publicly give to the Syrian government further confirm the presence of a Shiite Crescent in the region while the ongoing armament of the Arab states in the Gulf via the US forces Tehran to maintain its nuclear program -- which can be viewed as a relatively ineffective deterrent factor -- at any cost. Thus, with their shortsighted roles in the region, the US and the West are dragging Iran to adopt an extremist position tainted with radicalism.
We have previously seen in the case of Taliban in Afghanistan that Shiite extremism will breed its alternative: an extremist Sunni organization. Nowadays, in the atmosphere of uncertainty created by the Arab Spring, we witness the emergence of Salafism as an extremist Sunni doctrine, supported by Wahhabism. Many people are still shocked to see that Salafis secured 23 percent of the national vote in parliamentary elections in Egypt. While democracy and the quest for freedom are still emerging values, spurred by the Arab Spring, we cannot ignore the fact that these developments are also paving the way for Shiite and Salafi extremism.
As an early diagnosis, we can say the Muslims world is being pulled into a field of conflict between two hostile extremes: Shiite radicalism and fundamentalist Sunni Salafism. If proper measures are not taken, the Middle East faces the risk of being a bloody battlefield between these two extremists doctrines. As a matter of fact, the Shiite Maliki regime in Iraq has already being signaling that it can drag the country into a fraternal feud.
I partially explained above why I refer to three extremes -- instead of two -- in the headline. To elaborate on this, I can say that, concerned with the Shiite and Salafi extremism, some anti-democratic regimes in the Middle East, or in the wider Muslim world, may opt for introducing extremist, repressive secular regimes in their countries. We are already seeing the first signs that the developments in the Middle East have the potential to trigger repressive secularist practices in some Muslim countries, particularly in Central Asia, where freedom of religion and conscience is already problematic.
