Maliki has appointed many loyal supporters to senior positions in the army and other security institutions. As is typical of a failed state, the most important issue in Iraq is who controls security. The equation is as simple as this: Who controls security controls the state. Maliki did not even appoint an interior minister, so keen is he to keep the main security institutions, such as the police force, under his direct scrutiny. As expected, various security units, led by recently appointed loyal chiefs, have been stationed in provinces like Diyala, where the opposition Iraqi National Movement is strong.
Alerted by Maliki's agenda, Turkey's concerns over Iraq stem from several factors: First of all, Turkey is against any kind of political activism in Iraq that may harm the interests of the larger Sunni community. Secondly, Turkey is not happy about the rising influence of Iran. Despite Turkey having played a key role in the region over the past decade, Iran has successfully increased its regional influence since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Tehran has almost replaced Ankara's former role in Syrian politics. A similar situation occurring in Iraq is a worrisome possibility for Ankara. Recently, Turkey's foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, confirmed that Turkey and Iran are in competition on several issues. Syria and Iraq should be seen as clear examples of this competition.
Both the Syrian and the Iraqi cases have proved that those involved should pay more attention to the inner dynamics of Shiite politics. Iran is an indispensable ally in the Middle East for any Shiite political group, including Maliki's. Shiite dynamics have been very influential in helping the Damascus regime during its struggle for survival. Thus, despite their differences on various issues, whether secular or religious, Shiite political groups and leaders are not prepared to put their contact with the wider Shiite community in the region at risk.
For Ankara, the US position is quite surprising. The Obama administration qualified the Maliki government as “a democratic partner.” Washington may be in search of new partners in the Shiite world. But why Maliki? Paradoxically, Maliki may be more effective than secular Shiite leaders like Ayad Allawi. The US may create a kind of corridor to Iran through Maliki. Or, perhaps the US prefers to have several Shiite leaders in the region to dilute the Iranian monopoly. But the rift this causes between Washington and Ankara should be noted as another factor that helps Iran increase its leverage. Meanwhile, regardless of the fact that the US is in harmony with Maliki, Turkey is likely to deploy its resources to influence Iraqi politics.
In this vein, Turkey's relationship with the Kurdish region is critical. Washington's support for Maliki will be good reason for advanced rapprochement between Ankara and Arbil. It might even be in Turkey's interest to stay silent on US support of Maliki, as this will, conversely, help Turkey in other parts of Iraq. Realistically speaking, Turkey's leverage is very limited among the Shiite groups in Iraq. But US support of the Maliki government may help Turkey dominate the Sunni areas and even, to some extent, the Kurdish groups. On the other hand, current US strategy will indeed end in new disasters for Washington: The US has no chance of influencing wider Shiite politics, but Washington's support of Maliki may, this time, cause the loss of support from all Sunni groups.
