Luckily, Tunisia also represents our best chance to project a successful model for countries in transition because of its well-educated young population, the existence of a culture of compromise deeply rooted in history, the acceptance of different religions despite being overwhelmingly a Muslim country and close interaction with Europe for decades. It is comfortable being an Arab and African country while trading mostly with Europe.
Tunisia can potentially usher in a new era in neighboring Libya to the East because of close family ties and has the potential to have an impact on its Western neighbor Algeria. People here describe Tunisia as a small Turkey in a sense that many things resemble each other albeit with some differences. Even the composition of its economy is similar to that of Turkey with regard to the textile, agriculture and tourism industries.
Turkey realized Tunisian potential early on and mobilized international and regional efforts to help out Tunisia. Using its position as the chairman of the Council of Europe (CoE) last year, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu led the CoE delegation to Tunisia a month after autocratic leader Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled the country. The involvement of the CoE was crucial because it is the largest intergovernmental organization in Europe championing the rule of law, democracy and fundamental human rights. Its stamp of approval means dismissing baseless allegations such as Tunisia is rapidly becoming a fundamentalist state.
For example, CoE Parliamentary Assembly members who observed the election issued a very positive statement welcoming the fact that the election of the Tunisian Constituent National Assembly on Oct. 23, 2011, was free and democratic, thereby setting an example for the entire region. Turkey also lobbied intensively with the CoE members at the İstanbul meeting on May 11, 2011, persuading the Committee of Ministers to adopt a decision establishing a new policy regarding relations with neighboring regions, specifically with Tunisia.
This framework allowed the CoE to have political and technical cooperation with Tunisia, sending teams of experts, including the Venice Commission, to advise on a number of important legislative and constitutional changes. The CoE's Secretariat had talks with Tunisian officials back in October to develop an action plan. To integrate Tunisia further with the CoE, Turkey urged members gathered at the deputy foreign ministers' level in May 2011 to include Tunisia in the Forum for the Future of Democracy. The Tunisian delegation's participation in the Forum in Cyprus was a positive signal in that regard. Turkey believes strongly that links with the CoE would act as an important anchor for the development of Tunisian democracy.
During the term of CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) President Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, who is Turkish, Turkish deputies supported a proposal to create a special status with the CoE for the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. The proposal is still on the table and needs the approval of the Committee of Ministers. If it is accepted, the CoE will be closely involved in the democratic transition in the countries of the Mediterranean basin.
On the economic front, the Tunisian government faces a high rate of unemployment, at around 20 percent, regional disparities and income inequalities. To address unemployment woes, especially among the well-educated young population, it needs to diversify its trading partners and attract foreign investment. Tunisia heavily relies on EU members for almost 80 percent of its total trade. Faced with a sluggish EU market, Tunisia launched a campaign to diversify its trade portfolio. Turkey, the fastest growing economy in Europe, may play an important role in the new economic schemes of the transitional government in Tunisia.
With enough political capital and economic interests, Turkey can also deliver significant help in stabilizing Libya, an important trade partner and oil supplier for Tunisia. That is why the Tunisian government proposed the idea of developing a key strategic model among Libya, Turkey and Tunisia last week. When France lobbied the government to take up a similar project, the Tunisian government rejected French participation in the trilateral mechanism because it did not believe France had the capacity or capability to deliver what Tunisia needs.
When I talked to the Tunisian deputy prime minister responsible for the economy, Ridha Saidi, on the sidelines of a trilateral Turkey-Tunisia-Libya business forum held in Hammamet, I sensed his keen enthusiasm to promote partnership with Turkey. Stressing that his government has the strong political will to improve the lackluster trade record between Turkey and Tunisia, Saidi revealed that Tunisia will even review existing agreements with Turkey, including the 2005 free trade agreement (FTA) to create favorable conditions for Turkish companies to operate in Tunisia. The goal is to bring expertise, know-how, technology and capital from Turkey to address structural deficiencies in the Tunisian economy.
There is another area where Turkey and Tunisia share similar interests: Addressing grievances of expats living in Europe and insuring their well-being amid fears of rising far-right parties, xenophobia and anti-migrant and Islamophobic tendencies. It may not matter so much for Turkey but foreign remittances have been an important source of income for Tunisians. According to a May 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, foreign remittances accounted for 5 percent of Tunisian gross domestic product (GDP), the bulk of which comes from the EU. The unprecedented recession in the EU, coupled with hostile attitudes against Muslim Tunisians, may adversely impact the Tunisian economy.
Another worry is that a reversal of immigration trends and a return of Tunisian expats in droves may aggravate the unemployment problem back home. We have already seen the devastating impact of the Libyan crisis when thousands of Tunisian had to go back to Tunisia when Libya was thrown into turmoil because Col. Muammar Gaddafi decided to fight the rebellion. Turkey leads efforts in a number of regional and global organizations to raise awareness of xenophobic trends in Europe and keeps slamming EU governments for lack of a serious response to rising Islamophobic movements. Tunisia may need Turkey's cover on keeping its expats safe and sound in EU member states.
Tunisia also realizes that it may very well benefit from Turkey's keen interest in opening up to the vast African market. It markets itself as a gateway to the African market, saying Turkish companies should benefit from Tunisia's experience and labor force in entering into African markets. With Turkish economic might on its side, Tunisia believes the synergy between the two countries may also serve to strengthen its own existence in a number of African countries and help Tunisian companies penetrate into new markets, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.
Above all, Tunisia's new government realizes that further engagement with Turkey on the political and economic fronts is easier to sell to a public leery of where the country is heading. Because of deep historical and cultural ties between the two countries, Tunisians feel very close to Turks. There is comfortable bipartisan agreement in Tunisia for developing ties with Turkey. Unlike the French, for example, Turks never had a repressive colonial past in this country, and Tunisia enjoyed virtually autonomous status under Ottoman rule for over three centuries. The new partnership offers a win-win case for both Turkey and Tunisia.
