The new national security concept, adopted by the Georgian parliament on Dec. 23, 2011, is an updated and revised version of a previous one from July 2005 and serves both as a crucial driver of the government's regional and international strategic aims and a platform for discussions regarding the security challenges that Tbilisi is currently facing.
Georgia's political landscape changed substantially after the Rose Revolution in November 2003, which prompted structural reforms within the government, demonstrating that the problem had been a systemic one exacerbated by a lack of political will. In the aftermath of the August War in 2008, the key questions were how Georgia would define its regional policy, what strategy it would implement regarding the resolution of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts, and how relations with Russia would develop. The answers to these questions can be found in Tbilisi's post-2008 politics. The main changes brought about by the August War relate to two areas: the status of the conflicts and the actual control over the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Under the July 2005 policy document, Georgia aspired to build good relations with Russia based on mutual respect. Notably, it emphasized that the existence of a Russian military base in Georgian territory was not perceived by Tbilisi as a threat to its sovereignty. The concept attempted to balance the rhetoric, but underlined that granting Russian citizenship to residents of the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia could constitute grounds for military intervention. Indeed, this assumption became a reality during the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, when Russian officials justified their invasion by pointing to the need to protect Russian citizens living in South Ossetia. Russia argued that the legal basis of the operation was guaranteed by Article 14.5 of the Russian Federal Law on State Policy on Fellow Citizens Residing Abroad, which provides that “if a foreign state violates recognized norms of international law and human rights with regard to Russian expatriates, the Russian Federation shall undertake efforts authorized by international law to defend their interests.” This is the Russian version of the “responsibility to protect.”
The main change within the new security concept is that the document openly describes Russia as an occupying presence and states that Moscow's primary goal is to turn Georgia into a “failed state” in order to derail Georgia from its path towards Euro-Atlantic integration and to “forcibly return Georgia to the Russian orbit.” Another important issue is the threat of terrorism; the new document declares that “Russia uses [South Ossetia and Abkhazia] for recruiting and training terrorists with the aim of carrying out terrorist acts on Georgian territory.”
Georgia can envisage the normalization of bilateral relations only once Russia has withdrawn its troops. But describing Russia as an occupying state seems to allow Moscow to respond that the Georgian government is not ready to normalize relations, arguing that Tbilisi is trying to blame their more powerful neighbor for their own mistakes. The policy paper makes it extremely clear that “the enemy is abroad.” This issue will become increasingly important in light of the approaching parliamentary elections, and then the presidential elections next year.
In terms of relations with neighboring countries, Tbilisi continues to identify Azerbaijan as a strategic partner and Armenia as a close partner. The concept argues that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict still threatens the stability of all states in the region. Interestingly, the regional media is presenting those elements as new developments, but closer analysis reveals this stance is merely repeating what the 2005 version had already established.
As well as changes to Georgia's Russian strategy, the new concept envisages a pragmatic and realistic approach to EU relations, to be implemented as a process of “gradual integration.” NATO membership remains the top priority on Georgia's political agenda; just a few days before adopting the new policy concept, the Georgian parliament voted in favor of President Mikheil Saakashvili's plan to send more troops to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deemed a gesture of support and a message of commitment to NATO. The current government is keen to let NATO know they are eagerly awaiting the result of NATO's Chicago Summit in May 2012, which they hope will mark a significant step forward for Georgia in its drive to join the alliance.
Georgia is unique in the South Caucasus in the sense that its attitudes toward forming alliances and its wish to join NATO reflect the absence of a strong military ally; compare this to Armenia, which has Russia, and Azerbaijan, which has Turkey. First of all, this is primarily down to the lack of historical or cultural affinities with any of the big powers, which, had they existed, would have been revived following independence in 1991. Secondly, both Armenia and Azerbaijan have chosen their allies based upon geographical proximity along with either historical or cultural affinities, while Georgia looks to more geographically remote partners in the West. Full membership in NATO, as many experts have argued, could have prevented Russia from intervening in South Ossetia in 2008. However, others argue that the quest for NATO membership was actually the cause of the Russian attack on Georgia. Ultimately, the 2008 August Russian-Georgian war did not change the fact that Tbilisi's military cooperation with NATO is under the special category of “pre-alliance status” and that Tbilisi still aspires to full membership.
The main changes and challenges in the new security concept are the definition of the relationship with Russia and the orientation towards Europe through gradual integration with the EU. Moreover, the government wants to combine a pragmatic notion of balance in its foreign policy with a continuous strategy; the document proves that there has been a shift in the government's stance -- once ideologically driven, it seems now to be based on realpolitik. The ambivalence of the government during the Arab Spring demonstrated that while Georgia supported the color revolutions across the former Soviet Union, now it is far from adopting an ideologically driven foreign policy, preferring to wait until the situation becomes clearer.
