On the one hand, the addresses being provided to the military for the operations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are being changed and only the mountains are being bombarded; on the other hand, supporters of those who changed these addresses in Ankara force the General Staff deliver false statements.
A crucial question arises from all this: Why is Ankara so hectic and busy?
1) The process of making a new constitution and the presidential elections coincide at the same time. The deep Ankara has been waking up because of the constitutional priorities and the presidential elections that will take place over the next two years. There will not be another April 27, 1960 coup, but I should note that plans are being devised to interfere with the process of drafting the new constitution and to influence the presidential election.
2) The possibility that an investigation may be initiated into the Feb 28 process has particularly started to bother İlker Başbuğ who was the leader of the team that administered the psychological operation against the National Security Council (MGK) during the Feb 28 process, along with some media actors who followed his orders. Considering that 90 percent of the Feb. 28 coup was a psychological operation, it is only inevitable that those who planned and carried out that plan would be uncomfortable with the initiation of an investigation.
3) The Ergenekon investigation is nearing to an end. There have been attempts to ensure the court does not identify Ergenekon as a terrorist organization.
To this end, references have been made to a strategy that has been carefully studied and drafted since last September. The reports indicate that within this plan, psychological warfare is being staged to present Necdet Özel as a plain supporter and sycophant of the government. You should note that there were reports questioning who Özel would go with to the exclusive military facilities (army houses) as chief of General Staff.
For a while, this strategy was implemented, but in an attempt to guarantee that Necdet Özel would not join the opposite camp, certain circles started to argue that Işık Koşaner had recommended Özel for this position.
The operational side of this strategy might include attempts by pro-Ergenekon circles within the army to manipulate the struggle to ensure that combat against the PKK would be unsuccessful during Özel’s term as chief of General Staff. To this end, since Özel came to office, warplanes were given inaccurate coordinates to ensure that they would bomb the wrong targets. In this way, after PKK’s attacks in Çukurca, Özel, who oversaw the operations himself, was given a strong message: You cannot conduct an operation by ignoring us and you cannot administer the army without us.
Those who came up with the strategy did not ask Özel to resign and did not experience a row with the government. They did not hold any negotiations with Özel, but the pro-Ergenekon circles implied that he should extend support to their teams and be open to the information that they would offer. What needed to be done afterwards was to implement the plan by exploiting Özel’s good relations with the government.
The goal was to get along with the government by making small concessions. Therefore, instead of subjecting the military to a process of democratization and introducing it to civilian control and inspection, this group wanted to reduce the concept of democratization to pursue good relations with the government so that they would sustain their influence within the army via pressure groups. They also wanted to take measures against attempts to prevent the promotion of the figures that held similar views as theirs.
A plan drafted at the Fenerbahçe Army House was implemented more smoothly because of the lenient response and approach of the government, which agreed to small gestures by the military. Özel was also easily misdirected by the information from his former team; for this reason, those who drafted the plan considered that he had no alternative because of the psychological atmosphere in the military. It appears that the visits held by Özel to Ergenekon and Balyoz subjects in prison because of psychological pressure in the military pleased the plan’s makers. The same team that attempted to dismiss allegations and reports in the Taraf daily using Başbuğ’s infamous remarks, “ a piece of paper” misled and misinformed Özel, leading him to deny a headline in Taraf that said, “The land forces threw a game at the air forces,” with inaccurate information. The new documents that Taraf journalist Mehmet Baransu acquired undermined the credibility of Özel. Let me note that in the next stage of this team’s plan, a comprehensive media campaign will be held to ensure that an amnesty law is passed for suspects accused of match rigging, that international pressure will mount and that numerous efforts throughout the world will be exerted to this end.
What will be next? The step is based on the assumption that there will be an economic crisis in 2012. If there is an economic crisis, the now-silent cells will be activated and the PKK will carry out intensive attacks to make sure the Justice and Development Party (AKP) will become unable to govern the country.
The plans made so far have been aborted by reason and wisdom. However, considering the situation the AKP has fallen in and those who believe our smartness is good enough for us, I think it will not be so easy to abort a social engineering project that has been devised based on the possibility of a new economic crisis. I am worried.
