In general, Gen. Özel's profile distinguishes him only slightly from his predecessors, who insisted on asserting the military control over politics to various degrees. Gen. Özel's written interview with the NTV news channel was published on Monday and posted on the TV station's website. These were his first public remarks since he became the top commander in August.
In response to one question, Gen. Özel said the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) is to fight the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based on orders given by the civilian authority. This remark marks a departure from the traditional TSK viewpoint, which has long held that the fight against the PKK falls under the responsibility of the military, opposing the civilian government's authority to design policies to deal with the issue. In truth, it was only recently that the government made a shift in its policy, choosing to assert its political power in the fight against the PKK. The absence of civilian government authority over the TSK has played an important role in prolonging the approximately 30-year-long fight.
“Civilian control of the armed forces is crucial for any country hoping to achieve a successful democratic transition,” says Narcis Serra, Spain's minister of defense between 1982 and 1991, in his book named “The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces.” NATO member Turkey has taken some of the steps necessary to reduce the power of the armed forces in the course of the ongoing but slow-moving process of its democratic transition. But enough fresh reforms have not been enacted.
The European Commission's progress report on Turkey, released on Oct. 12, outlines the problematic state of civilian-military relations in the country thus: “The number of incidents where the armed forces exerted formal and informal influence over political issues beyond their remit continued to decrease. No change was made to the Internal Service Law of the Turkish Armed Forces, which defines the duties of the military and contains an article leaving the military significant scope for intervention in politics.”
Article 35 of the Internal Service Law has been used as an excuse by the TSK to stage military coups in Turkey. There is debate in Turkey about lifting this article, and Gen. Özel's remarks to NTV demonstrate the TSK's reservations about the lifting of this problematic article. Gen. Özel denied that the article is intended to create the basis for the TSK to stage military coups.
On the controversial issue of the TSK's subordination to the Ministry of Defense, Gen. Özel comes up with a bizarre excuse for the TSK's opposition to such a measure. “This issue [the TSK coming under the ministry's authority] is a very important and sensitive topic with regard to the Turkish Republic's continuation in both the political and military dimensions. Such a plan should be evaluated in depth,” he said. Turkey is the only NATO member country where the armed forces have not been brought under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, and where they report to the prime minister.
Gen. Özel's remarks generally showed the TSK's current stance with regard to coming under full civilian democratic control to be problematic. At the end of the day, though, making the necessary reforms in all areas falls under the responsibility of the government and Parliament.
Serra gives a recipe for the military reforms that should be made in a democratic transition, which Turkey should take as an example: “Progress in a military transition must include legal and institutional reforms, changes to the military career structure and doctrine, and control of conflict levels.”
