The Ottoman bureaucracy that took the name of “republican bureaucracy” overnight defamed everything that was Ottoman in order to legitimize its own rule and the nation it set out to reinvent. This nation would be of the same ethnic origin, religion, conviction and actions. Although Turks did not invent robotics, in a way the first trials of the science occurred in Turkey in this republican period.
Nowadays we are coming to terms with our past and the pluralism of the population after the many purges that have thinned a once-complex society since the 1920s. We are increasingly seeing the Ottoman coat of arms worn as a badge on people's lapels and the sultans' signatures (tuğra) on automobile windshields. I have spoken with some people who own such cars. Many of them don't even know the name of the sultan whose signature they have slapped on their vehicle. They are not anti-republican either, but they want more than what the republic has offered them: genuineness and a taste of what they ought to be. Is this normalization? In a way it is. But more precisely it is a return to history, reconciling with the past the present realities of the country and everything associated with it.
Turkey is discovering that its pluralism is not a weakness but a source of strength. Similarly, Turks have discovered that the power of the country does not emanate from the state but from its people.
The empowerment of individuals through politics has been tried three times in the past. The first was by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes back in the 1950s. He was brought down by the bureaucracy and hanged in 1960. The second was Prime Minister (and then president) Turgut Özal, and third, now, by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government. In all three attempts the empowerment of individuals and partial democratization has led to the rapid development of the economy and social change. In the first two cases politics was unfortunately not allowed to develop in tandem with the economy and society. Military coups and governments have historically stifled major structural change. Only in this current instance has the tutelage of the bureaucracy been drastically reduced, and Turkey is taking off.
Turkey is carefully eyed by the peoples of autocratic Islamic countries, some of which have already overthrown their tyrants. The current Turkish prime minister, who was trained in religious schools and heavily influenced by religious values, has toured the North African countries of the Arab Spring (Egypt, Tunisia and Libya) and defended secularism as good governance. He advised the people of these countries not to idealize religion or to abuse it with politics. This rhetoric, though received very positively by audiences in the West, must also have surprised them because it was bereft of any potential threat.
Well, Turkey is not a threat, but it may be a competitor which can easily be won over as a zestful partner in all spheres of life. For example, Turkey eagerly supported the Nabucco pipeline, which will transport gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iraq to southern and southeastern Europe via Turkey. However, there is a serious competitor: the South Stream consortium, a Russian-Italian joint venture. Although this consortium is fiercely competing with Nabucco, the Turkish government granted it access to the Black Sea region. Is this a contradiction? Hardly, because whatever the outcome of the competition, Turkey will be a major transit route for future European gas supplies, whether it is the Nabucco project or South Stream or both.
At the heart of such a vital geostrategic web, or as a key “hub state,” developing relations with Russia and Iran, on the one hand, and the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe, on the other, necessitates a more rigorous and well planned security on Turkey's part. More and more Turkey's security needs will be intertwined with those of her business partners and allies. Recognizing this need, Turkey has begun to develop a joint security architecture with its Western allies, especially within the framework of NATO. Turkey's recent agreement with a NATO plan to place a radar system on Turkey's southeastern border which will guard against hostile missile attacks was a move in this direction. Turkey's second move was in intelligence sharing, and its third has been to develop functional relationships with Arab countries, especially those with budding popular regimes. These are Turkey's future allies and partners. As these relationships develop further and bear fruit Ankara will be better able to negotiate its rights and expectations on the international stage.
Since it is now obvious that Turkey will not be a supporter of the Islamization of the Middle East and its newly evolving popular regimes, nor will it be an ally of “rogue states” like Syria and Iran, Turkey has begun to draw more attention to its foreign policy objectives. All of a sudden some observers have discovered a long-term strategic vision that approaches regional security in a more multifaceted manner than ever before. With some EU countries facing bankruptcy while the Turkish economy thrives, Ankara will be a busy capital for allies and partners and Turkey will become more assertive and independent in its foreign policy. But no more will occasional conflict and disagreement with her traditional partners be viewed as representing a “clash of civilizations.”
