At the United Nations in New York, the Palestinians tried to keep their dream of an independent and viable state alive, maneuvering between one-sided Americans, divided Europeans and the rest of the world that is fed up with all the delaying tactics. In Turkey, the media proudly reported about the rising star of the prime minister who has managed to position Turkey as the indispensable country in the region and as the model that all new Arab democracies want to copy. That might be true to some extent. At the same time, the government was violently reminded of the uncomfortable truth that Turkey’s attractiveness abroad will be seriously damaged if the country does not manage to solve its domestic Kurdish problem soon. Sticking to the old routine of bombing terrorist outposts in Iraq is clearly not enough. Legitimate Kurdish demands can only be met by continued reforms. The Kurds know, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan knows and world public opinion knows.
And Europe? The EU is still trying to find a way out of the gravest economic crisis it has faced since the introduction of the euro. Speculation on a Greek default persists. Big European banks seem to be in need of another round of state support. Public backing in key countries such as Germany and the Netherlands for additional loans to Greece is weakening. A growing number of analysts and politicians realize that the problems of the eurozone go well beyond the present setbacks in Athens and Rome. This crisis is forcing the EU to rethink its financial and institutional architecture.
Many options are being discussed, and one seems to gain ground, at least among pro-European pundits who are afraid that the never-ending postponement of structural reforms could deal a lethal blow to the raison d’être of the European Union.
Before going into the details of one possible answer, let me remind you that the way out the EU opts for in the end will have huge repercussions for Turkey as well, both economically and institutionally. Don’t believe the politicians who claim that a deepening and unresolved economic crisis in Europe will have no effect on Turkey. It will, especially on the already alarmingly high current account deficit.
But there will be a long-term institutional impact on Turkey as well if the EU would were to the advice of people like Ulrike Guérot and Charles Grant. Both work for influential think tanks in Berlin and London and are promoting the idea of a so-called “core,” or two-speed, Europe. They envisage a Europe with three circles: The first one would be a euro-core, consisting of the strong EU economies that would be willing to share more sovereignty in economic and fiscal matters. They would probably also opt for further integration in other fields, such as foreign and security policy. In the second circle we would find those EU member states that, for the moment, are not able or willing to join the core group but might do so in the future. Finally, there would be a circle of “friends” of the EU to which one day the United Kingdom may belong because the Brits prefer the pound to the euro and are opposed to more integration.
Another possible contender for “friend” status is Turkey, a state that, according to Guérot and Grant, is visibly downgrading it eagerness to join the EU and has regional power ambitions that do not go well with full EU membership.
A few years ago, these kinds of scenarios were debated only among academics. Nowadays, they have returned with a vengeance. EU leaders are obliged to contemplate the possibility of a Europe that develops with different speeds for various members. Hopefully sooner rather than later we will learn which strategic vision for the EU as a whole will be followed. If the EU decides to go for a strong nucleus, surrounded by different circles, Turkey has to make up its mind. Join the core group of leading nations but also accept the constraints that come with it, or be in a circle with less influence on the EU as a whole but more freedom to stick to an autonomous economic and foreign policy.
