In countries that lack democratic experience or have a political regime that relies on repressive measures, the people are seeking a different political scene by taking to the streets, even if that means chaos. In Turkey, democratic experience has not been repressed, despite the efforts of the military and their supporters. The changing Muslim approach and understanding now corresponds to the realities of the changing world, while the Kurdish identity has finally opened up a legitimate sphere of politics.
For the first time in this country, the cultural rights of the Kurds have been perceived as a natural demand by the majority of the people and it is now acceptable to discuss any view, regardless of how irritating it is. In other words, a new era has started where the Kurds can abandon violence and maintain control in Parliament. The fact that this and the need for a new constitution in Turkey have coincided offers a striking opportunity for Kurds because it is now possible to redefine the state. During this process, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has cleared the way for the Kurds’ involvement in civilian politics, despite some setbacks. The Muslim identity has contributed to the process where the ruling administration has come to a point of resolution.
In such an environment, what should be expected from “rational” Kurdish politics is that they will use this historic opportunity to fight for the recognition of the rights they have been asking for over the years. However, for a number of reasons, including the political competition in the Southeast and the orthodox leftist ideology of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the Kurdish movement has identified the AKP as its main opponent. This was so severe and obvious that the movement did not even extend its support in the constitutional referendum for the amendment that introduced strict conditions for party dissolution. In the June elections, they attempted to push the limits of the system by nominating disputed figures as deputy candidates, even though they were aware that they would not be endorsed if elected. It is possible to take this as some sort of civil disobedience; however, the decision to boycott Parliament implies that this was a previously designed and drafted policy. It seems that the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)/PKK preferred standing against the Turkish Parliament instead of using the sphere that the parliamentary democracy offered them.
At this point, an unexpected catalyst has taken initiative: a Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) report drafted by Cengiz Çandar, which analyzed the conditions for the PKK to come down from the mountains, has been published. The report combined the views of the state or the government and the PKK leadership and pointed to a probable resolution. In addition, the report further signaled that there was a state of confidence for the first time between jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the delegation holding negotiations with him on behalf of the state. The report was welcomed by both Ankara and Kandil. Shortly after the publication of the report, Öcalan announced that they had made a deal with the state and that there were legitimate grounds for peace talks.
Over the past two centuries, the Kurdish movement has never been so legitimate. And at this point, the PKK kidnapped three people in an attempt to provoke the government, which remained silent to the incident. It then carried out an attack against a military unit but, most importantly, on the day they were counting the bodies the Kurdish movement made an announcement of democratic autonomy that did not go beyond a pathetic gesture. This was important because it was a step taken by the Kurdish side deliberately. The announcement of democratic autonomy also conveyed that they were not involved in civilian politics.
But why has the Kurdish political movement decided to pursue a seemingly irrational line of politics that excludes civilian politics? What could be the rationale behind this decision? All I can say is that the BDP/PKK is afraid of a political stance that focuses on talks and negotiations because talks and negotiations take the parties from the margins to the center and spread tension. This, however, requires the reemergence of civilian politics with its ideology, strategy and actors. Sadly, these elements are still missing in the Kurdish political movement and the PKK does not like this alternative political route.
Therefore, as Turkey nears a resolution, the Kurdish political movement moves away from it and it is becoming increasingly illegitimate on the eyes of the people because of this.
