In fact, both parties could have achieved their goals by attending the relevant parliamentary session because, obviously, a solution is possible only when the necessary constitutional and legislative amendments are made, and the venue for this is Parliament.
However, this alternative is not attractive to opposition parties for various reasons: In that case, we would have talked about the responsibility and political prudence of legislation as a whole, and there would be no possibility to stand against the Justice and Development Party (AKP). However, the primary outcome the BDP and the CHP are expecting out of this strategy is to push the government into a corner and even force it to take a knee, as argued by a CHP executive.
But the opposition committed a remarkable mistake: It failed to appreciate that people are sick of this type of politics and that they now perceive these attempts to wield power as an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the political rival as inappropriate. The prime minister, in consideration of this new state of mind, kept the tension alive, arguing that boycotters would back down; he further called on the boycotters to take part in the legitimate ground of Parliament. In the meantime, he also gave the message that he would work hard to achieve consensus on the making of a new constitution.
At this stage, it seems the sphere of action for the opposition has been significantly minimized and that the short-term political destiny of the CHP has been surrendered to the AKP. The question to be asked is why it failed to note that the boycott policy is not so wise. In fact, it is possible to excuse the BDP for political reasons because it did not know the CHP would take a similar step. The BDP's dream was the inauguration of Parliament in the absence of its deputies and to force it to seek a solution for the Kurdish issue. In this way, the BDP would have become the chief actor in the process and the demands of Kurds would have determined the content of the agenda prior to the process of drafting a new constitution.
However, the plans did not work out; and the primary factor for the failure was the CHP's decision not to attend the oath-taking ceremony in Parliament. The efforts of reconciliation that put the party in a difficult position afterwards suggest that the boycott move was not extensively deliberated or was based on a totally incorrect perception of society. In any case, this has been a fiasco for the CHP. Even some writers who have been supporting this party unconditionally for months underlined that this was politically wrong; and the party had to use some of these writers as mediators on TV.
Apparently, the CHP, like the BDP, will make itself into an actor, and to this end the party was looking for a way out that would prevent a possible “lack of distinctive personality” that could emerge during the process of drafting a new constitution. It is possible to assume that the impact of the Ergenekon network and its probable negotiations with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu are the key factors behind it. However, the selection of such a strategy shows that a different calculation and assessment has been made. Roughly speaking, the CHP's future politics will be based upon efforts to show that the state is under the guardianship of the AKP. From this angle, the oath-taking boycott makes sense in an attempt to create the perception that Parliament is an extension of the government.
On the other hand, BDP politics is based on a fairly opposite perspective and understanding: It seeks to impose a perception suggesting that it is struggling with a state inclusive of the AKP as well. However, it is not possible for these two perceptions to exist simultaneously; and the argument that the AKP equals the state is fairly unrealistic. In this way, all these moves actually cancel out each other, eventually serving the interests of the AKP.
But all have been saying for months that the only political way to push the government into a corner while serving democracy is to promote reforms and to ask for these reforms for all. Otherwise, there is no possibility other than that they will emerge as marginalized actors vis-à-vis the AKP.
