In this first article I will look at the two junior opposition parties: the Turkish nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). In a second article I will cover the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
Let’s start with the MHP. The party has gotten a lot of media attention in the last couple of weeks but that was not related in any way to their campaign. The MHP was rocked by a sex video scandal that was grist to the mill of conspiracy theorists. I guess we will hear more about this after the elections. I really hope that the masterminds behind this smear campaign will one day be exposed. Whatever your opinion is of the behavior of the men involved, from a democratic point of view it is not acceptable that anonymous threats result in the stepping down of important politicians. Shocking events like this not only damage the image of the party concerned but of politics in general. Because the blackmail tactics worked this time, it is an open invitation to every person or group with a grudge against a particular party to resort to dirty tricks to ruin careers. MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli did his utmost to deny the poisonous impact of the sex scandal on the morale and the internal functioning of the party but the damage was done.
A second reason why the MHP was often mentioned by election observers had, again, nothing to do with the things Bahçeli said or, better, shouted during election rallies. Because all polls indicate that the AKP will again come out as the biggest party, the million dollar question was and still is whether the ruling party will get a simple majority of parliamentary seats or a so-called super majority. In the first scenario, the AKP will have to find a compromise with opposition parties on the new constitution. When, in the second option, the AKP would manage to get more than two thirds of the seats in Parliament, the party could in principle do whatever it wishes without having to look for consensus. The party that will decide whether the first or the second script will be implemented is the MHP. If they pass the 10 percent threshold, the AKP will need to compromise. If the MHP fails to do so, the AKP is free to do what it wants. It has lead to the curious situation that many democrats who believe a national consensus on a new constitution is very important, are forced to hope that a party they strongly disagree with, the MHP, still makes it into Parliament.
All the voyeurism and tactical games that explain the presence of the MHP in the headlines should not hide the fact that on policy matters the party had little or nothing interesting to say. I cannot remember a single proposal or initiative that managed to create the impression that the MHP has a plan for Turkey. All we heard was the same old rhetoric based on fears, attacking other parties without coming up with a positive agenda. Bahçeli is very good in painting the darkest nightmares, but nobody will have any sweet dreams after listening to the MHP leader. When, as seems likely at the moment, the party will make it to Parliament, the conclusion can already be drawn that on the big issues that will be discussed after June 12, the MHP has nothing to contribute. Whether it is on the new constitution or the Kurdish problem or relations with the EU, the MHP has become, more than ever, the party of the uncompromising “No,” reflecting the negative feelings of a noisy minority in Turkish society but not able to influence the future-oriented debates between the different representatives of the majority in Turkey that wants to move on.
A more visible BDP
The jury is still out on whether the BDP will be able to play a decisive role in the debates after June 12. They definitively have been very visible in the run-up to the elections, trying to profit fully from the space left by the AKP, after the ruling party started the Kurdish initiative in 2009 but backed down soon afterwards, leaving behind many extremely disappointed Kurds. Although I fully understand the bitterness felt by many Kurds and the frustration about the promises that were not kept that the BDP is trying to exploit in this campaign, I have very ambivalent feelings about the way the party wants to maximize its electoral support.
The functioning of the BDP in the last couple of months mirrors their operation in Parliament since 2007. On the one hand, there were the constructive efforts made to sit down with the AKP and try to find a solution to many of the pressing problems still facing the Kurds, especially those living in the Southeast. That approach included reasonable proposals on regional autonomy, the use of Kurdish by local authorities and, although not fully elaborated yet, plans for the use of their mother tongue in education. Unfortunately, the ruling party was not really interested in including Kurdish politicians and their plans in finding a solution to the Kurdish problem. After the arrests of many elected Kurdish local politicians and the failure to continue with the Kurdish initiative, most Kurds got the impression that the government had given up on them. It strengthened the radicals inside and around the BDP who never believed that gradual reforms or compromises with the AKP would bring the Kurds anything.
Maximalist tendencies in the party grew stronger, as we could see in the September 2010 constitutional referendum when the BDP opted for a boycott and the choice for new parliamentary candidates with a militant profile.
My worries are based on how the anger about missed opportunities and mounting old style state repression was translated into an election campaign where the use of violence against political opponents has become an almost inextricable element. Using a campaign to ventilate exasperation is one thing, making threats and intimidation an integral part of your electoral efforts is a totally different thing.
The problem is not only a moral or tactical one. I know the police have been extremely forceful and brutal on several occasions where BDP politicians were involved. Trying to enter into a competition with the state security apparatus might bring the BDP some extra sympathy votes from among its hardcore constituents. At the same time, there is a real danger that after the elections it will be very hard to step back from the present escalation. The Kurdish problem is real and it needs to be solved, sooner rather than later. That will only happen when after June 12 the AKP, the CHP and the BDP manage to get together and strike a deal. This will include concessions from all parties involved. Is the BDP able and willing to do that after a campaign in which they are burning so many bridges with their future partners?
