If you take this sentence by itself it sounds pointless. As Hürriyet columnists say, you would have to send the commander who uttered the sentence to a mental institution. But if you evaluate the sentence in light of suspicious attacks on military outposts, commanders who publicly state that they thought militants were smugglers and secret conversations about Herons that still beg to be clarified, you understand that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), or at least some echelons of it, is in favor of the continuation of the PKK’s existence.
In today’s circumstances, violence is the last remaining instrument allowing the TSK to intervene in politics and prevent democratic undertakings. They no longer have the opportunity to use the fear of creeping Islamic fundamentalism as an excuse to intervene in politics. In this sphere, the judiciary enters the picture and carries out some obstructing maneuvers. But reforms regarding the Kurdish issue remain the most effective tools and determining factors in drafting a new constitution as well as other legislation, such as local government reform. The Kurdish question is the key, and at the same time the biggest obstacle, to the [government’s] democratic initiative. The most important requirement for this problem to cease, or at least be alleviated, is the silencing of the guns. When guns are talking, the opportunity to create a more liberal and democratic constitution can be delayed indefinitely. A constitution that does not approach the Kurdish question realistically cannot claim to be democratic in today’s Turkey.
One thing the observers of Turkey should see is the fact that the tradition of military interventions did not enter this country with the Cold War. Certainly, the Cold War strengthened coup stagers and made them more adept at staging coups, but our recent history starts with the coup d’état of 1908, which has had enormous affects on the military. It was with the 1908 coup that the public started to view coups positively and accept them as legitimate. This is why coups are divided into “good” and “bad” ones in this country. Until very recently, military interventions against reactionary attacks, such as the March 31 [1909] incident, or conservative prime ministers, such as [Adnan] Menderes, were perceived as being good coups.
This is what is taught in textbooks and how these events are treated by the majority of the media. It might as well be that tomorrow a coup d’état, staged against the threat of Turkey’s possible disintegration, can be classified as a “good” intervention. Coups are a childhood disease of the Turkish Armed Forces that is very difficult to cure.
The events we have witnessed during the course of the Sledgehammer case, the sheer numbers of those implicated and the level of their rank are proof of just how fragile our democracy is, even today. True, we have come a long way in terms of democratization, but when we take a look back, we see that we are not all that far from our starting point. Military spending remains outside the scope of the inspection of the Court of Accounts, while the political institution has no say in the curriculum of military schools. We have no idea what those kids in Anatolia, being indoctrinated to become military officers, are being taught in school.
