In a referendum held the previous day, Turkey (in the aptly put words of The New York Times editorial) “fortified its freedoms in a referendum … with 58 percent of voters approving a package of constitutional amendments meant to end army meddling in civilian politics. That overwhelming ‘yes’ vote showed that Turks are fed up with ultimatums and coups and want elected politicians fully in charge.” (Sept. 16)The voting in the referendum confirmed once more the democratic maturity of Turkey’s citizens. Aside from a few cases of quarrels over boycotting the vote or not in the predominantly Kurdish east and southeast regions, voting concluded without any serious incident, and the results were obtained quickly. Despite the rather effective campaign to boycott the vote by the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), not less than 77 percent of the electorate participated.
The main result of the referendum was that the people of Turkey at large supported measures to further liberalize and democratize the regime. A clear majority (58 percent) voted “yes” on the package, responding to a statement by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that the amendments would open the way for the adoption of an entirely new, civilian and democratic constitution that would replace the existing one drawn up by the military 30 years ago. The message coming out of the vote was the people’s demand for an end to the bureaucratic regime of tutelage and a continuation of liberalizing reforms. Considering the fact that Kurdish citizens who boycotted the vote in response to the BDP’s call are definitely also for democratic change, it is possible to claim that not less than two-thirds of the electorate in Turkey stands behind the message above.
A considerable part of the electorate, not less than 42 percent of those who voted, however, said “no” to the amendments. The concentration of the “no” vote in the western and southern coastal regions, adds an extra meaning to it. That extra meaning is that the relatively more affluent and in general better educated people living in these regions do not trust the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) government for this or that reason. Surely a small part of the “no” electorate is in favor of the bureaucratic regime of tutelage if not an outright military regime. But the rest (rightly or wrongly) are worried that the AKP government will either take measures to threaten their relatively liberal lifestyles or establish a regime similar to that of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Prime Minister Erdoğan and his government need to show the utmost care to assuage the worries of this part of the electorate, especially by seeing to it that the promised entirely new, civilian and democratic constitution is based on the broadest possible consensus.
The main lesson to be drawn by the parties that led the “no” campaign, and especially the leadership of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), needs be that those parties which resist the people’s demand for greater freedom and democracy are not likely to win elections. If the CHP wants to ever come to power, it must give up its role of being the main political support for the bureaucratic regime of tutelage.
I have always argued that the CHP (and even the Kemalism it claims to represent) has two faces: an elitist, authoritarian, statist tradition that does not respect the people’s religious and ethnic identities, considers the people as a horde in need of being led by an enlightened civilian and military elite who know what is in the best interest of the people, and a tradition that emphasizes the role of critical reasoning and the aim of catching up with contemporary civilization. The CHP can never come to power or even achieve the character of a serious opposition party if it does not internalize the fact that contemporary civilization is defined by democracy, human rights, the rule of law and respect for differences. Former CHP leader Deniz Baykal was not aware of this one bit. I hope its new leader, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who, even if incoherently, is signaling that he understands better, will not draw the wrong conclusions from the results of this referendum.
Another clear fact revealed by the referendum results is that opposing the popular demand for further liberalization and democratization has had a huge cost for the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The results indicate that the MHP lost the support of a substantial part of its traditional electorate by opposing the constitutional amendments. It would be no prophecy to claim that an MHP which sticks to an authoritarian reading of Kemalism that does not respect people’s ethnic identities is doomed to further marginalization.
There is no doubt that the BDP has been highly successful in its campaign to boycott the vote. It is clear that the BDP is able (in one way or another) to show the way for a substantial part of the Kurdish electorate in the East and Southeast. The BDP is at least for this reason entirely justified in demanding to fully participate in the drafting of a new, civilian and democratic constitution that will secure the rights of Kurdish citizens. The BDP needs to, however, fully understand that understanding and support for its demands from larger society is possible only when violence comes to an end. The BDP thus needs to make greater efforts than ever to convince the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to lay down its arms.
