Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu’s Republican People’s Party (CHP) is almost certain to emerge stronger the day after the referendum vote if only because of what economists called the “dead cat bounce” effect. Throw a feline cadaver from a high enough height and it will look like it is taking a jump. Essentially, the CHP cannot perform any worse than they did in the 2007 elections when after years in opposition they still struggled to get 21 percent of the vote. Even according to the Justice and Development Party’s (AK Party) most optimistic projection, the “no” camp, which Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu has championed, will more than double that figure. And there is just the outside chance that the “no’s” will win. The Turkish electorate tends to favor the strong, and in that case the opposition leader will begin a general election campaign with the reputation as a giant killer.
This raises some anxiety not just among the governing AK Party but among Turkey watchers and Turkey investors who have become accustomed to what they see as a market friendly government. The source of anxiety is not that an untested CHP administration will come into office immediately. It is that if the electorate manages to inflict a wound on the AK Party, its own behavior will become more erratic. This would occur even if the government wins the referendum but only by a narrow margin. For a start, the Treasury will consign to the shredder its much-lauded fiscal rule (the commitment that was designed to reassure investors in the absence of an IMF program). If the government does indeed decide to spend its way to the next election, chances are it will not be on a scale that will do lasting harm. Vigilant markets will not give Turkey that much rope.
However, Turkey had a strong reputation at the moment based in large part on an ability proven over nearly a decade of keeping public spending under control. It believes it has a valuable start over rival economies in emerging from the 2008-2009 recession. It is a lead it could squander if it surrenders to populist policies.
At the same time, it is in Turkey’s long-term interests to have a credible opposition party and one that does not always have to say “black” if the government says “white.” At the moment, of course, the opposition is saying “no” to the government’s “yes” in the belief that the referendum is not about the actual content of reform but where power in the Turkish political system lies.
Şahin Alpay in a column earlier this week expresses the belief that Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu is making some of the right noises about coming to terms with Turkey’s past and engaging with a program of reform. In short, he appears to be doing what the CHP should have done in 2002, which is analyze its shortcomings and initiate a makeover. At the same time Mr. Alpay has his doubts -- based, it has to be said, on a disillusioned insider’s knowledge of how the CHP works. Is Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu all rhetoric and no substance, and even if he has the will to change, can he persuade his party to go along?
These are questions time will answer, but it is curious to remember they were the same sorts of questions that were asked of the AK Party back in 2002. Had it really changed its spots from the Erbakan-led fringe and could it carry diehard party loyalists to the political center? The answer we gave then was that Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül were more than clever enough to realize that the only way to win an election is to lay claim to the political center. This is a lesson that Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu appears to have already learned.
