Beyond the referendum, an imposing agenda

Disregarding the name-calling and shouting aspects of the campaign, which will continue even this week, is necessary in order to see what is at stake and occupying the real post-Sept. 13 agenda. The choices on Sunday will shed light on whether there will be a fresh attempt at adopting a new constitution and whether or not the Kurds will internally distinguish their tendencies and thus-far hidden differences on democratization. Needless to say, these two major elements are closely tied together.

From one perspective, it has become interesting to watch the game plan developed by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and responses by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Despite the immobility inside his party, Kılıçdaroğlu showed that he was after all able to produce some surprise tricks, which has made life for Erdoğan harder than he had expected. Unlike Baykal, Kılıçdaroğlu “touched” people and, one small move after another, tried to pre-empt Erdoğan’s moves by talking about, for example, a general amnesty, turning the notorious Diyarbakır Prison into a museum of human rights and lowering the election threshold from its current 10 percent. He has already proven to be a tougher nut to crack than his predecessor, who would have certainly entirely focused on the rhetoric of “radical Islam vs. the secular republic.”

In the past few days of the campaign, Kılıçdaroğlu moved even further, closer to the heart of the matter for the country. In an extended interview, he acknowledged that Turkey needs to adopt a brand new constitution. Going into detail, the CHP leader let us know that his party was preparing (for after the referendum) a draft of a “declaration of will.” Kılıçdaroğlu noted that the party would not prepare its own text, but design a framework of ideas and principles, and that it would form the basis for the CHP’s pledge for the next elections.

Kılıçdaroğlu mentions some major points from the work above: an “all-encompassing” text that would embrace all of society, with an emphasis on the separation of powers, an efficient judiciary, enhanced freedom of conscience and creed, a free press, immunity of deputies limited only to free speech, a lower election threshold and rights enlarging the concept of equality. He concluded that the draft, which would be prepared by experts, should be discussed by the parties and adopted by consensus.

The response has not been delayed. On his way back from Diyarbakır, Erdoğan also took the issue up and said that a draft prepared by the Özbudun commission (later shelved by the AK Party) would be reintroduced to civil society as a main item for the elections planned for June of next year.

Now we’re talking. If -- and only if -- these two leaders are sincere, and mean business, will Turkey will have come to a defining threshold and a momentum in which it can discuss a modern “social treaty” that might take the country quickly into a brighter future.

Speaking about wider reform of the Constitution in this sense means, after a long, bumpy ride, the two main and traditional adversaries of Turkish politics agree on the need for reform.

It also complicates the picture somewhat. On the one side is a leader whose “one-man show” has culminated in fatigue, and, on the other, an untested new figure who tries to expand his limited room for maneuver within a “Soviet-style” party structure in order to “tear it out from the state” and to move it into the “civilian sphere.”

This affects the reasoning for the outcome of the vote. It is reasonable to pay attention to recently expressed concerns that while a “yes” vote of closer to 60 percent would tilt the balance disproportionately in favor of Erdoğan and away from the fragility of Turkey’s democracy, it would also serve to “strangle” the line of renewal within the CHP under Kılıçdaroğlu.

Certainly, “yes” winning is of the utmost importance.