Headscarf: yardstick for democratic credentials

When the Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader announced that the issue will be resolved by their initiative many, including myself, were nicely surprised. A committee within the party headed by Professor Sencer Ayata has started an investigation into the matter. The expectation was that the sociology professor in charge would dump the old policy of the CHP that blocked the way for the freedom to wear headscarves, particularly in universities.

The outcome so far is disappointing. Last week Professor Ayata proposed a middle-way solution: cover only some part of hair and keep the rest open as is exemplified by the traditional way of wearing the headscarf in Anatolia in order not to offend the secularists. He also declared their intention to consult Islamic scholars to see if this was in perfect harmony with the notion of a secular state that should be free from the rulings of religious authority. Instead, the CHP’s steering committee could have come up with a simple idea: that they have no business interfering in the choices of individuals. No, they have once demonstrated that the CHP is incapable of transforming itself.  The headscarf issue has in fact become a way to test the ability of some social and political forces to adapt themselves to new circumstances. In this, Islamic circles in Turkey have proved their ability to develop new responses to old problems. When headscarves became a problem in universities during the 1980s, the argument of Islamic scholars and intellectuals was that wearing a headscarf was an “Islamic obligation” for Muslim women. That is to say that they defend the headscarf through an Islamic language of “obligation.” They engaged in debates with the secularists to prove that wearing the headscarf is part of Muslim women’s religious duties. But in the late 1990s, Islamic groups changed their language, logic and basis for defending the headscarf, which was portrayed by secularists as a symbol of jihad against the Kemalist regime.

Islamic groups brought in the idea of human rights to justify the headscarf, talking about the freedom of choice, the right to an education, equality before law, freedom of expression and conscience. They frequently referred to international human rights conventions and applied to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the grounds that their fundamental rights had been breached by state policy in Turkey. Activists often gave examples from European countries and the ECtHR, not from Iran or Saudi Arabia, to establish the right for girls to wear headscarves in universities. All this shows that Islamic groups began using the language of modernity to defend their lifestyles and belief system.

The right to an education, the principle of non-discrimination, the ECtHR and international human rights conventions are often referred to in defense of the headscarf, not Islam which they believe is the absolute source/frame of reference. This is because universal norms and values have been discovered by Islamic groups as a way to protect their identity and lifestyle. In order to preserve the particularities of Islam and Islamic identity they needed, and therefore utilized, the universal; to enjoy and protect the particular (Islam) they approved and then applied the universal. This came out of the belief that Islamic self-references do not explain much, that they do not justify any demand in the context of real-politik and that they do not bring about any results in contemporary Turkey. Thus they started to speak with modern notions/concepts of rights. They departed from an Islamic self-referentialism in favor of a universal language with a transformation of discourse and probably identity as well.

Some Islamic intellectuals use the term and idea of a “social consensus” to resolve the problem of the headscarf. The basis of such a consensus is to present the headscarf as an issue of religious freedom and a basic human right. The search for a social consensus implies that it can be sought on a non-religious/secular ground, that is, liberal rights theories not that of the language of obligation within Islam.

While all these changes are taking place on the Islamic front, the Kemalists, politically represented by the CHP, continue to view the headscarf issue as a means to oppress, exclude and marginalize conservatives. But this authoritarian attitude has led to the marginalization of the Kemalists themselves who now appear as a movement that opposes the values of political modernity.