We have not yet left the age of our own Kremlinology behind.Today, Gen. İlker Başbuğ, the general who led the military between 2008 and 2010, officially retires. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that he finally feels utterly at ease, after two turbulent years during which his once-powerful, feared institution was subjected to a constant flow of revelations of alleged misconduct, systematic acts of political engineering politics, attempts to disrupt the constitutional order, treating the elected government as a sort of public enemy and much else.
It was a very difficult period for the general. The more he spoke in public, the less he was treated with trust. In his ambivalence he seemed eager to take some shy steps for transparency (like regular weekly briefings, which did not work that well) which he combined with occasional, angry outbursts at the critical and outspoken media, as well as patronizing comments with open political content, openly challenging the law. His performance left many in doubt.
In his farewell notes over the past few days he did not change his tune. He painted a picture of an army under constant attack with the use of freedom and technical advances in cyberspace, which he believes must be understood as a systematic campaign to undermine the military. His message was, in a nutshell, that it was a difficult period and that times would be even tougher ahead.
What should now be expected under the new chief of General Staff, Gen. Işık Koşaner? A much more reserved and cautious personality, even he was as clear as he could be in the take-over ceremonies. He repeated the basic principles of the republic, expressed devotion to defend those values, promised an ongoing “struggle” and, as is customary with the high command, leveled accusations against the media.
If by the “struggle” we should understand continued arm wrestling to keep the privileged position of the military and its autonomous and rather immune status in today’s Turkey, then it is true, as Başbuğ says, that his successor will face a tougher fight. In early August, the civilian government expanded its “territory” by imposing its will over the appointment of a number of commanders to key posts, suggesting some and rejecting some others. This move means that it will be very difficult for the generals to return to the old days, when they dictated the conditions.
Another challenge for Koşaner will be how he is to position himself as various trials and investigations against his officers develop. In the spectacular Sledgehammer case, arrest warrants have been issued against more than 20 top-ranking, active officers. Though the warrants were later dropped, the trial, due in December, will be a test for Koşaner’s legal principles.
There are now two critical thresholds for the direction and intensity of the “struggle” or, some would say “the institutional resistance” against adapting to the realities of the day. If the upcoming referendum ends with a victory for the “no” camp, the national debate will be focused on how to build a powerful enough coalition for the elections due next year. And if the single-party majority can be broken then we may face a relapse in efforts to normalize civilian-military relations as well as on other major, thorny issues.
The new top military commanders, who have included the terms patience and resolve in their speeches, are discreetly hoping for a change in the favor of the status quo. Neither Koşaner nor his staff have signaled that they are ready to widen or speed up the necessary reform process in their institution.
Despite increased civilian pressure and legal challenges, the military elite is a social class with its own privileges and it is profoundly preoccupied with interpreting the former as a threatening enemy. Much needs to be done: The army needs to become professional and efficient, with modern training and shorter periods of duty for the soldiers. The military budget must be fully open to civilian scrutiny and subject to serious austerity measures. The entire apparatus must become transparent and fully accountable. Mechanisms must be built within to prevent and reveal subversive activities aimed at disrupting politics. Military education, severely polluted with a political ideology, must undergo revision and modernization. The chief of General Staff must be subordinated to the Ministry of Defense, rather than the Prime Ministry.
All these issues have been shelved for decades. They need to be approached in a civilized manner and solved through careful negotiations between the government and the generals. The more success in that field, the speedier the normalization process. Koşaner’s success will be measured by the degree to which he cooperates -- or doesn’t.
