For many, much more than just deciding “yes” or “no,” the burden stems from whether or not to even cast a vote at all. This part of the dilemma has more to do with a moral choice than a political one, and Kurdish voters may feel they are betraying the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) by casting any vote.
The days of the “we shall not vote” campaign are over. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its political wing, the BDP, initially thought that their will to defy what the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government brought to the national vote would prevail. The reason for the boycott was, in a sense, to make manifest to Ankara how alienated Turkey’s Kurds felt from any reform attempts.
This argument had many valid points. The Kurdish initiative was not managed well at all (a point now acknowledged, if vaguely, by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan); BDP’s predecessor was shut down by the top court; and members of its wide-spread, local political network -- the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) -- were arrested in a broad sweep. The PKK and BDP reasoned that under such circumstances disappointed Kurds would fully support them in joining the boycott.
Despite the broken hearts and bitterness, it soon proved to be an incorrect calculation. The argument’s weakness was that it had chosen to ignore collective Kurdish memory: To many Kurds the amendment that would revoke the immunity of the generals and their subordinates responsible for the extremely brutal coup of 1980 was a ray of hope for justice and truth. The cruel experience of being treated like third-class citizens made the proposed amendments to reform the judiciary, which they see as “the extended arm of the hard state,” a possibility for a better future than this one.
In other words, the PKK and the BDP tried to narrow the focus on the issue to only include Kurdish demands for civil rights and forced its supporters to take a stand that disregarded broader, national reforms which, in reality, unavoidably contain Kurdish demands. It was a gamble, a test to calculate whether Kurds in general would turn their back on whatever the elected power in Ankara does. But it brought many Kurds into conflict with the PKK/BDP line. What more than 10 Kurdish civilian and professional organizations recently declared in Diyarbakır was a rather unusual and fierce response. “We shall vote ‘yes’ and we call on the Kurds to do so en masse” was the message, conveyed by Galip Ensarioğlu, the chairman of the Diyarbakır Trade and Industry Board (DTSO). And when the co-chairman of the BDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, issued a threatening counter-message, Ensarioğlu’s response was even tougher: He accused Demirtaş and other BDP figures of being out of touch with their hometown, Diyarbakır -- a humbling challenge.
This exchange is unprecedented, and very telling of how deep the divisions are among Kurds. The Ensarioğlu family, as well as many others who joined the civilian platform, have had more than their share of ruthless state suppression. Many of the elderly relatives of those who participated in the civilian platform were mainly conservative and right wing, and were exiled in 1960 to military controlled camps where they were held for months without reason. It was then they realized that they were receiving this treatment simply because they were Kurds.
It will be now rather difficult for the PKK/BDP line to claim a monopoly over the Kurds political behavior, because they do not have a monopoly on their painful past as individuals and families. Like Ensarioğlu, many “urban” Kurds (“white Kurds”) identify strongly with the wider fate of Turkey. Like Sezgin Tanrıkulu, a prominent lawyer engaged in the struggle for democratization for decades, a lot of “urban Kurdish” intellectuals feel that “normalization” in Turkey must happen with a commitment to peace by all Kurds. So, by trying to alienate and radicalize the masses for the “boycott,” the BDP is now alienating itself from the very segment of society which it claims to represent. Meanwhile, BDP’s “advisory body,” the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), wishes to engage the Kurds in a “democratic autonomy” project that, some Kurds feel, signals a significant shift in thinking. They believe in order to reach that stage one has to engage in democratization at the national level first.
If major Kurdish cities, such as Diyarbakır, Van, Mardin, etc., go to the polls and overwhelmingly vote “yes,” this might expose the BDP and the DTK to criticism of being insensitive to Kurds’ and (the “democracy hungry” Turks’) hopes and may lead to a weakening of sympathy for the PKK. Paradoxically, a sudden return to violence before the referendum might also have a counter effect on the BDP line.
At the moment, leaders of the party endorse the boycott, but as internal divisions among the Kurds become evident, what Prime Minister Erdoğan will say and do in Diyarbakır on Sept. 3 becomes even more important.
