The “no” camp is keen on putting the blame entirely on the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government for imposing changes without seeking consensus. The insistence works as part of the myth-building around a politics in which the AK Party is depicted as the despotic force and the opposition is democratic. Some circles abroad are affected by these efforts and join the discussions over whether or not the moves ahead are built on consensus.Is this the real picture? Certainly, the recent political adventures in Turkey, ever volatile, turbulent, speedy and complex, put a burden on memory. Therefore, a quick look over what happened on the political stage after the July 22, 2007 elections may be very helpful.
It will be helpful not only for understanding the mistakes and false manifestations of sincerity, but also for estimating whether a “yes” or “no” outcome will pave the way for a comprehensive move on a brand new constitution this year or next.
When the AK Party swiftly mobilized for an early election after the threatening April 27, 2007 e-memorandum signed by the military command, its main message was a new constitution for the country. A commission of legal experts, under the prominent expert and Venice commission member Ergun Özbudun, was asked to prepare a draft.
The landslide with 47 percent support for the AK Party meant that it would be Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who would present the draft to the public. The civil society was engaged almost immediately in the early autumn of 2008, and the issue climbed up to the top of the agenda. But, instead of letting the draft “float” as a base for debate, the AK Party leadership made a mistake: In late September, they met in a secluded resort near Bolu, revised the text and announced it as a “proposal of their party.” This was not received well by the opposition.
Yet, the echoes of the society, from business circles to bar associations and other NGOs were strong enough to carry the debate further. But a disturbing escalation of PKK attacks at that time led to some confusion within the AK Party and, facing a nationalist outcry from the opposition, the plans were revised.
In early 2008 the reasoning regarding the amendments among the AK leadership was simply the following: If we pick out the amendments regarding the headscarf and pass them first, we might have a less turbulent time passing the others. This reasoning, a tactical error, provided the pretext for the hostile judiciary, which saw an opportunity to strike back at the AK Party with a closure case in March 2008.
Understandably, the dramatic and utterly problematic indictment blocked fully all further efforts to change the constitution until the autumn of 2008. Meanwhile, the closure process encouraged the opposition -- smelling blood, happily – to stop communications altogether with the ruling party (instead of defending it for the sake of democracy). Deniz Baykal, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) at the time who had refused to meet with President Abdullah Gül (he met Gül only three times until his resignation from CHP leadership earlier this year) became a fierce opponent of any sort of constitutional amendment.
When the voices of “consensus” hit the roof at the end of summer 2008, then-Parliament Speaker Köksal Toptan entered the picture. He wrote a letter to the four parties with parliamentary groups and asked them to send two deputies each to form a “parliamentary commission for reconciliation” in order to prepare amendments to the constitution and changes to the laws on political parties and elections (thresholds, free speech issues, etc.). The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and and Democratic Society Party (DTP) agreed, but since the CHP categorically refused to be part of any effort at consensus building (a position that has remained unchanged until today), the commission could not be started.
As of the beginning of this year, the AK Party faced a constant deadlock and a painful dilemma on how to move ahead. After some desperate calls for dialogue, Erdoğan chose the tough path. In an impulsive move, he decided to challenge the blockage of the opposition by way of referendum. The stand of the CHP and MHP became even tougher, as the final package was appealed to the Constitutional Court.
This summary shows how cynically and hypocritically the term “consensus” has been used by the opposition leaders and their followers, such as the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), some trade unions, and certain militant professional associations. The worst part of the story is that all sides -- both the “yes” and “no” camps -- know that Turkey cannot live with a constitution that can no longer solve problems, because it is itself the problem. They know that a brand new constitution is inevitable. Now hopes are tied to the referendum, which might teach us what consensus really means.
