Bozan Tekin, a PKK spokesperson, told reporters from a base in Iraq that a lasting cease-fire is possible if Turkey stops military operations, releases some 1,700 “political” detainees and starts peace negotiations directly with the separatist group, with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan actively involved in the process. Tekin cited the holy month of Ramadan as a reason for the move. At the same time, news emerged that the PKK has threatened to kill religious and community leaders encouraging people to vote “yes” in the upcoming referendum.
Also, while contending that a cease-fire might lead to a peaceful, political solution, Tekin confirmed that the PKK has, in “self defense,” blown up a pipeline in southeastern Turkey carrying Iraqi oil.
In the past the Turkish state has rejected the PKK’s cease-fire declarations, saying a cease-fire assumes it is two legal parties in conflict. The PKK has also scrapped previous cease-fires due to continued Turkish military operations. The PKK is classified as a “terrorist” organization by the US and EU and other countries, and PKK violence has undermined the present government’s attempt to enhance Kurdish minority rights and end the 26-year separatist conflict. The PKK is now under pressure to keep its popularity in the southeast of Turkey, for it has not contained its senseless violence.
But a cease-fire is more than simply not firing or stopping hostilities. It has to include mechanisms to ensure that neither side violates the agreement and mechanisms to ensure that those who do violate it are investigated, exposed rapidly and, if necessary, condemned and sanctioned. A cease-fire has to be designed in such a way that it can build confidence between the opposing forces. Each side needs to know what the other side is doing, either through direct observation or through the reports of trusted third-party intermediaries. Each step that one side takes that might make it militarily vulnerable to the other needs to be matched by a step taken by the opposing party. Cease-fire documents are usually accompanied by a map, and also by an exercise in mapping and verifying the positions of the opposing forces.
A cease-fire fails partly because it is a weak agreement with no map, partly because two different versions with extra demands exist, partly because no trust at all exists between the opposing forces and partly because the mechanism set up to guarantee the cease-fire is not given the mandate or force necessary to complete its task. The negotiating teams should come to the table determined to improve on past attempts. The PKK’s cease-fire until September offers an inadequate timetable for what will be a complex set of actions. Experts propose that 90 days would be more realistic for completing these activities, and it is the PKK’s claim that it can be done quicker that really causes doubt about its sincerity.
Nevertheless, some argue that the cease-fire is worth pursuing but add nothing to this abstraction. This view is creating a secondary controversy over the efficacy of efforts to reach a peaceful solution. But rather than wasting energy defining the indefinable, we need to sincerely and persistently get down to developing strategies that can really work. Consistently and explicitly we must insist that societal peace, accord and prosperity come through civil, diplomatic, educational, cultural and economic engagement and empowerment, human rights and the consolidation of democracy, equity and justice, rather than through uncontrollable, unsupervised military force or armed struggle and coercion.
The greatest obstacle to a cease-fire is that hostilities are continuing in Turkey and across the border. As sovereign, the Turkish government has a right and responsibility to protect its people and borders. The PKK cannot infringe upon this right. While instability continues in the Southeast due to PKK violence, protection rackets and other impositions, while the PKK maintains cross-border terrorist and clandestine activities, the cease-fire cannot be implemented. The cease-fire, albeit only tacitly accepted by both sides, should have a strong enforcement mechanism, but very little can be done to enforce its provisions. A political resolution to the conflict, a very sincere and robust mechanism for enforcing the agreement on societal peace and then some important gradual steps are needed for a comprehensive cease-fire to become a reality on the ground.
