I say partially because control of İmralı was transferred last May from the military to the Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast Guard Command, which are affiliated with the Ministry of Interior on paper but which are under de facto control of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). Nevertheless, İmralı is now at least under the control of the political authority to a greater extent. What change will this make to finding a solution to the decades-old Kurdish problem? I believe none in the short term. But civilian control over İmralı should be seen as part of the government's efforts to sit in the driver's seat in a solution to the Kurdish problem as well as the security aspect of the matter.
Last Sunday was the 26th anniversary of the beginning of the PKK's bloody campaign in Siirt's Eruh district as well as in Şemdinli on Aug. 15, 1984. In the words of Orhan Miroğlu, a Kurdish intellectual and a columnist for the Taraf daily, this was the day the Kurdish uprising started.
Since then, about 50,000 people, mostly PKK militants and Turkish security forces, have died.
Having launched the bloody campaign for Kurdish independence, the PKK has since the 1990s sought autonomy mainly in the country's predominantly Kurdish, war-stricken Southeast and East.
The PKK declared yet another unilateral cease-fire on Friday to last through the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
From the PKK's point of view, this is a good political decision, i.e., the cease-fire comes as a relief for devout Kurds.
Buzan Tekin, a spokesman for the PKK, said from a base in northern Iraq last Friday that the cease-fire will be in place until Sept. 20 and could be extended if Turkey satisfies certain conditions. He said a lasting cease-fire could be possible if Turkey halts its military operations, releases some 1,700 detained Kurdish politicians (most of whom Turkey sees as terrorists) and starts peace negotiations with the insurgents.
The Turkish political atmosphere, however, is neither ripe nor mature enough to accept the PKK conditions. No nation would accept such conditions, i.e., open dialogue with a terrorist organization. However, it is no secret that there have been press reports in recent years about secret talks between the PKK and state elements, talks that have never been denied.
It can be ruled out that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which initiated a democratic initiative primarily to address the Kurdish problem, will meet the PKK conditions.
Proposed constitutional amendments do not specifically meet Kurdish demands but contain military and judicial as well as other democratic reforms. They will be put to a referendum on Sept. 12. General elections are scheduled to be held in July 2011. Before these elections take place, it is hard to see the ruling party making any move that can be seen as a breakthrough to the Kurdish question. The PKK's demands do not seem acceptable for consideration due to the existing negative political atmosphere.
The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has already declared that it will boycott the referendum on grounds that the package does not contain any reforms sought by Kurds. But opinion polls indicate that the majority of Kurds will not heed the BDP's call for a boycott.
The two remaining opposition parties -- one from the left and mostly associated with the military-led establishment and the other with ultranationalist ideology -- have been campaigning against the constitutional amendments. This is despite the fact that the package intends to make reforms to the 1982 military-dictated Constitution.
The above-mentioned mental state of the opposition parties is playing a significant role in dashing hopes for a solution to the Kurdish problem, which is expected to lessen PKK violence. Although the government's democratic initiative has failed to make a breakthrough in the Kurdish question, it has at least paved the way for a more open discussion of the Kurdish issue.
This debate also displayed that a majority of the public is not ready to stomach a resolution of the Kurdish question in a way that will allow the Kurds to freely express their identity and live in peace and in unity with Turks.
The three opposition parties' negative stance on democratic reforms, as they demonstrated during parliamentary debates on the reform package and currently on the referendum process, are influencing their grass roots negatively and hindering a meaningful solution to the Kurdish question.
It is very unfortunate that the current PKK cease-fire is fragile, taking into consideration the immaturity of the Turkish political atmosphere to take courageous steps on the road to a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question. Similarly, the pro-Kurdish BDP has failed to seize the opportunity to use Parliament as a platform to address the Kurdish problem. Instead, the BDP prefers to maintain its close links to the PKK by acting in line with orders that it has been taking from Öcalan.
Kemal Burkay, a Kurdish activist living in Sweden, asks whether the PKK wants peace and whether powers (deep elements within the Turkish state) giving directives to Öcalan will allow a solution (Star daily, Aug. 15). This is a critical question that is hard to answer.
Since İmralı is now mostly under civilian control, a solution may come some day, if not sooner.
