Duties that are passed on need to be understood accurately on time so that good work can be put forth and good records are left for history. Talking after someone is long gone is of no benefit; however, it may be helpful to make some evaluations; and this of course without personalizing certain matters and not without considering the esteem of the institution at hand.
Başbuğ actually got off to a good start. In the first days after he assumed duty, his care in asking the reporters on duty while he was visiting Antıkabir how they were indicated that he believed both public relations and the media were important. Soon thereafter he began to conduct press meetings. The sociological analysis he provided during the first meeting signaled that he was interested in the social sciences. Some newspapers dubbed him “an intellectual commander.” In reality, the results of his analysis were not correct and far from being scientific truths.
That’s OK. One had to smile and nod at Mr. Başbuğ’s statements, such as, “Students that come from villages take advantage of religious communities and orders because they cannot find a place to seek shelter,” and, “If we were a social state then this would be resolved,” when compared to the supporters of the 1997 postmodern coup who said, “We don’t need sociologists!” And in truth, nobody objected to his approach to the Kurdish problem with his particular childish romanticism or his seeking refuge in an epic discourse instead of understanding the mistakes at the heart of the matter.
From the first few press meetings it became apparent that Mr. Başbuğ liked cameras and microphones. That’s fine. Let his desire to be seen spread throughout the media. What was important was not satisfaction resulting from great photo opportunities and star-studded appearances, but the delivery of accurate and contemporary messages. And the chief of General Staff did give correct messages. For example, in a meeting when coups and juntas were being discussed, he said, “Nobody who is involved in anti-democratic activities can find a place for themselves in the Turkish Armed Forces [TSK].” These were words that deserved applause. However, in time there were changes in this upright position that the commander held. He had a great deal of interest in the media, but he only maintained his relations through a limited segment of journalists. He met up with a few journalists, talking for hours. He wasn’t able to kick off a general initiative. He was not even able to fix the General Staff’s accreditation problem in the least. He partially lifted the practice, which began during the abnormal conditions of 1997, later on noting that he would “expand” upon this progress, but he wasn’t able to do that, either. His prediction regarding a newspaper that he didn’t like, stating that it would be “closed down in three months,” was not particularly called for.
While Başbuğ’s image remained in a positive light, I’m not sure what happened and how. Başbuğ became the patron of those being tried for planning coups in the Ergenekon trial.
Disregarding the ongoing trial, he declared the suspects innocent and exerted efforts to transform the evidence into meaningless information. He called the “Plan to End the AK Party and Gülen” nothing but “a piece of paper,” for example. When the actual document of the examined photocopy surfaced and it was proven that the actual document was the hand-made product of a military officer who was working under his command, Başbuğ embarked upon a difficult period. His reference to artillery found in excavations during the Ergenekon investigation as “pipes” was a real scandal. If only he hadn’t made such a mistake. If only the post of the General Staff wasn’t shaken due to such simple mistakes.
Not content with the mistakes above, Başbuğ stood behind the generals in the press’ presence, scolding journalists, giving speeches and dishing out advice. At one point he grew enraged, shaking his finger and brandishing threats, completely overtaken with his anger. He said an asymmetrical war was being waged against the TSK, but he didn’t pursue the issues of raids on our outposts and the negligence and errors that led to our young boys being killed. When he grew angry he spoke of “traitors,” prating on about “those of impure blood,” but he provided no concrete refutation of allegations that would shake the status of our military. If only he had appeared in front of those cameras that he loves so much when certain allegations occurred and say: “Oh my people who keep us on our feet with their tax money! These allegations are not true and here's the evidence to prove it,” this would be ease our burning hearts, Aktütün, Dağlıca, Gediktepe, Reşadiye, Hantepe; all of these horrible attacks were accompanied by allegations of negligence. Satellite photographs, intelligence reports, drone images, etc. -- these all created suspicions that in these attacks there were also errors (even acts of betrayal). Başbuğ should have met such allegations with a cool head and begun a serious investigation. And if anyone was found guilty of negligence or carelessness, then he should have punished them. But he didn't.
When the Balyoz allegations reached the agenda, Başbuğ's balance was thrown off entirely. There was no reason to be so shaken. Since he had said, “There can be no coup-plotters within the TSK,” he shouldn't have interfered in the legal process. He acted as if the judiciary had no information or documentation in hand, as if the prosecutors hadn't prepared their indictment according to concrete findings, as if judges had not accepted that indictment. When an arrest warrant was issued for the suspects, he chose to gather the defendants at military facilities and not deliver them to the judiciary. This can only be called “aiding and abetting.” How can the head of such a distinguished army allow such an offense?
As this piece is being written, the silence continues in the face of frightening allegations regarding the Hantepe attack. Drones detect terrorists and report them to the relevant authorities; they even display the attack frame by frame. Why was no help sent to those children? Why wasn't the intelligence evaluated correctly? Why were our soldiers delivered willingly into the jaws of the wolf? Without giving hard answers to these questions, he should not be in that seat!
In any case; he came and he's leaving, just like those before him. He leaves behind the operations he held and the scars he left. When we look from this perspective, there are scores of sentences that could be started with “if only” when it comes to Başbuğ. Why? Because we would never want the TSK or those who represent it to disintegrate. People are transitory, institutions last. In order to protect the esteem of these institutions, they must be well administrated and do the right things. Başbuğ actually had a great chance in his hands, but he wasn't able to take advantage of that historic opportunity. He both left himself in a tough spot and shook up the institution. If only it hadn't been that way. I hope that the next chief of General Staff, Gen. Işık Koşaner, will turn the crisis experienced in recent years into a grand opportunity. Why not?
