It was not an easy task. The deliberately continued political tension between the traditional establishment and the ruling party in Ankara, visible most clearly in the gaps and miscommunication between the institutions, has constantly carried fuel into the polarization between the “concerned old” and “hopeful new” among the people. The arguments I have heard center persistently on the future of Turkey, and what sort of “order” these people desire, and how they perceive the state and the government (as two poles). It is the sort of consolidation of opinion that will definitely make the vote a strictly political one, for or against the elected power that proposes the change rather than what it proposes.
There will be three sides, as already decided, on the vote.
Apart from the “yes” and “no” camps, there are also those who will boycott it, refusing to take part. The latter are mainly composed of dismayed urban and educated segments, with origins in the left and Kurds who sympathize with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)/Freedom and Democracy Party (BDP) line. It is certain that their absence -- particularly of the Kurds -- will have an impact on the balance between the “yes” and “no” votes.
The boycott side acts on principles and on premises bordering a utopia that seem unrelated to the realities of the day. They would like to see a completely new constitution, one in which Kurds’ identity and constitutional rights will be recognized, and argue that the proposals do not pave the way for bringing the coup generals of 1980 before the courts. They fear chaos and more tension if the “no” side wins. And they expect some sort of civilian dictatorship if the “yes” vote comes out superior. They complain viciously when they accuse the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of “imposing its will” rather than seeking consensus.
The declared principled stance, although many of them deny it, is based on a primitive fear (and arguably also on a profound disappointment) of the left, which is bruised and helpless in politics. Debates with them center exclusively on the perceived nature of the AKP. It clouds their understanding, and makes the boycotters’ stance problematic in a sense that their expectation of making the AKP weaker somehow (they are unable to explain how) will prepare a better future for Turkey.
This attitude also forms the basis of other urban intellectuals, businessmen or traditional secular/republican segments. A “yes” vote for them is a path to the enhancement of the power of the ruling party, which will make the “takeover” of Ankara even easier.
When confronted with the proposal to discuss what would possibly go wrong with, for example, the establishment of an ombudsman or the protection of private life, the response is categorical: “It is to disguise the real, evil intentions of the AKP.” When further confronted with the question of whether the final ruling of the Constitutional Court did not -- despite a problematic choice of path -- “fine-tune” the details of the reform regarding the judiciary, the attitude remains fully untouched. The arguments become irrational; in dismay, the Constitutional Court is accused of being either “frightened” or “sold” to the government. The AKP is the stirring, polarizing, dividing, and thus dangerous, power that acts on unilateral change and it will terminate democracy -- basta!
One may then choose to pursue another path and argue as the Democrats in the US did. When they met full-scale and often nasty resistance from the Republicans, all they did was to call for consensus, and when it proved impossible, they passed a massive reform on a narrow margin. This was a way to prevent a further radicalization of the political scene. This often receives the “but Turkey is not the US” response, which in the end kills all conversation.
In an environment like Turkey’s, it seems inevitable that taking the maximalist position will remain for some time. The opinion is deeply entrenched in paranoia, suspicion and internalized (mis)conceptions about how Turkey is and will actually be ruled. The division bears within it a potential lesson for the harsh political leaders in both camps to help understand each other, creating a democracy where it will be understood that arguing on the issues rather than identities will take them further into a better future.
The vote balance, which now stands between 52-48 in favor of “yes” (a fresh, unannounced poll indicates, I am told), is therefore being taken as a natural result of a country coming out of its cocoon, formed of dogmatic ideologies, kept frozen for so long. It is a healthy sign, as long as it teaches.
